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ABSTRACT 
The various post-colonial armed conflicts bedeviling Third World States have claimed numerous lives and 
properties, drained its resources, displaced millions and have put the territory’s development move on the 
reverse gear. This thesis, from the theoretical perspective of Third World Approaches to International Law 
(“TWAIL”) is a contribution to the various on-going discussions on the roles that colonialism played in 
triggering bitter conflicts, confusion, and unhealthy rivalries amongst Third World peoples. Not losing sight of 
the internal dimensions to these conflicts, the thesis also examines the degree of contributions by some power-
drunk and despotic Third World governments to these conflicts. The artificiality of the colonial imposed 
boundaries and the misrepresentation that characterized the series of treaties between the Third World and the 
colonial powers are still haunting the former colonies. After many decades of attaining independence, the West 
African States of Cameroon and Nigeria were assailed by conflicts largely connected with land and maritime 
borders between the two States. In North Africa, the people of Western Sahara in their struggle for self-
determination are on a warpath with the Kingdom of Morocco. In the south-east Asian island of East Timor, its 
right to self-determination from Portugal was truncated by neighboring Indonesia and was only realized in 2002. 
The Berlin Conference remains till date one of the greatest undoing of the Third World by the imperialists in the 
light of the degree of ignorance, mockery, and mischief with which Third World territories were shared and 
colonized. 
 This thesis uses the ICJ judgments in the three disputes highlighted above to analyze the various 
conflicts in these former European colonies and concludes that the imperialists, having unduly exploited the 
inadequacy, Eurocentricity, and unfairness of international law, used the Berlin Conference and the colonial 
project to inaugurate and institutionalize the trend of civil conflicts across the Third World. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP OF THE THESIS 
This work employs legal analysis in the issues that it investigated to drive home its points. It 
largely draws its methodological approach and inspirations from Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) – a liberating intellectual movement that has its roots in the anti-
colonial movement which arose partly in response to decolonization and the end of direct 
European colonial rule over non-Europeans.
1
 TWAIL is an intellectual, ideological, and 
political reconstructive movement that aims at demolishing and unseating the inappropriate 
ways that international law is being used by the West as a tool for dominating, subordinating, 
annihilating, and dehumanizing the Third World. TWAIL employs constructive intellectual 
criticisms aimed at transforming international law into a system based on justice, fairness, 
and equality rather than racialized hierarchies. TWAIL as a liberating intellectual movement 
seeks to eradicate “the conditions of under-development in the Third World”.2 The TWAILian 
perspective is apt for the inquiry that this thesis embarks upon on the basis that it explores the 
historical, legal, colonial, and socio-political structures, institutions, actors, and processes of 
international law vis-à-vis the peoples of the Third World. TWAIL is a methodological tool 
employed by scholars in analyzing international law, its institutions, and modus operandi. In 
accordance with the TWAILian project and objective, this thesis is both “reactive and 
proactive”.3 It is reactive to the extent that it identifies, exposes, and responds to the historical 
and colonial factors that gave rise to some of the conditions in the post-colonial Third World. 
                                                          
1
 See Makau Mutua “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int’l L. 31 at 31; Antony Anghie “What is TWAIL: 
Comment” (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int’l L. 31 at 39; See also Obiora Chinedu Okafor “Critical Third World 
Approaches to International (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2008) 10 Int’l Comm. L. Rev. 371. 
2
 See Mutua “What is TWAIL?” supra note 1 at 31. 
3
 See Mutua “What is TWAIL?” supra note 1 at 31. 
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It is proactive because it canvasses for the conditions of liberation, independence, and 
peaceful co-existence of Third World peoples. 
 The major part of the research involved reviews of primary and secondary materials. 
On primary materials - ICJ decisions, colonial treaties, and agreements, Statute of the ICJ, 
UN Charter, UN Resolutions, and other international instruments were reviewed and 
analyzed. Secondary materials like scholarly books, journal articles, and newspaper reports 
were also relied on. 
 Therefore, this study uses the ICJ decisions in three cases namely: Cameroon/Nigeria 
border dispute; the Western Sahara case; and the East Timor case to examine and analyze the 
conflicts that have plagued these Third World States. The thesis identifies Berlin as the 
birthplace of many of the socio-political instabilities that are being experienced in the Third 
World, when in 1884/85, the Europeans converged in Germany to resolve their differences 
pertaining to the sharing formula of Third World territories. This work attempts to establish a 
nexus between the colonial encounter and the series of conflicts that have made the peaceful 
co-existence of the people elusive and retarded development in the territory. 
 Although there are a couple of other disputes of various characters between Third 
World States that have also been decided by the World Court, the three cases that are being 
examined in this work are selected based on the following criteria: 
i.  The States and territories selected are former colonies of European States of Great 
Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Portugal, respectively. However, the history 
of East Timor as a decolonized State is somewhat and significantly peculiar in the 
sense that when Portugal decolonized East Timor in 1975, Indonesia invaded the 
island few months later and re-colonized it until 2002; and 
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ii.   The struggle for the realization of the right to self-determination reverberates in all 
the three cases. 
 For the inhabitants of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula, their crusade for the exercise of 
right to self-determination is just at its fledgling stage. In Western Sahara, their journey to 
self-determination appears endless having lingered for about four decades while that of East 
Timor has been successfully realized. 
 This study will be preceded by a general overview of the research problems. This part 
of the work will enhance our understanding of the historical, socio-political, and legal 
developments and issues that snowballed into series of conflicts. Structurally, the thesis will 
proceed in the following order. An attempt will be made to depict what pre-colonial Africa 
looked like before the arrival of the imperialists.  Here, some of the socio-political structures 
and arrangements in various Empires and Kingdoms across the continent will be highlighted 
with an objective of demonstrating that Africa had various popular and organized 
governments and engaged in commercial and diplomatic relations and thus contributed to the 
development of international law. 
 Thereafter, it will examine the land dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria and 
attempt to discover the nature and history of various treaties and agreements between the 
colonial powers and indigenous Kings. The role of this part of the inquiry will be to discover 
the factors that gave rise to the signing of those treaties, the understanding of the local Chiefs 
concerning the treaties, and how they were constructed by the World Court in order to arrive 
at the decision in the case. More particularly, it will consider the fate of the affected 
population in the disputed territory and their clamour to be given the right to choose the State 
they wish to belong to. 
xv 
 
 On the other hand, the thesis will attempt to excavate how the foundational seed of 
instability was sown in the North African territory of Western Sahara by one of the 
imperialists. It will strive to demonstrate how, for about four decades, the decolonization 
project for the people of Western Sahara is struggling to see the light of the day, with no 
success, owing to the economic and political interests of some world powers and the re-
colonization strategy by a Third World State. The role of this part is to show, among other 
things, the legacy of instability bequeathed to North Africa by the imperialists and how some 
Third World leaders have continuously acquiesced to this destructive inheritance.  
 With regard to the successful exercise of a right to self-determination, the next part of 
the thesis will look at the struggles that led to the realization of independence by the island of 
East Timor. Here, it will explore the ambiguities and uncertainty of self-determination 
evident in the manner that the ICJ pronounced that: “the principle of self-determination of 
peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the 
Court ...” and yet declined jurisdiction in the same case. 
 At the end of the above inquiries and analysis, the thesis will make its findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations and will go ahead to call on the United Nations and its 
organs as well as Third World leaders and the led on the need for the peaceful co-existence of 
the people and development of the territory and the possible ways to achieve these. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF A PEOPLE: A TWAILIAN 
ANALYSIS OF ICJ DECISIONS IN CAMEROON V. NIGERIA, EAST TIMOR, & 
WESTERN SAHARA CASES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION, GENERAL OVERVIEW, AND STATEMENT OF 
 RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
At the heat of the nineteenth century European exploration and exploitation of the Third 
World markets and peoples, Portugal sold the idea of convening an international conference 
to its fellow imperialists so as to avoid the possibility of bloodshed that could arise from 
territorial disputes amongst the colonial Powers.
4
 Presided over by the then German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, fourteen European States met at Berlin from November 15, 
1884 to February 26, 1885 in order to settle the perceived differences as to who gets what 
within them. Europe therefore unilaterally and artificially divided Africa amongst itself, and 
consequently ‘legalized’ and institutionalized the acquisition of territory in the continent.5 At 
Berlin, the hairs of the Third World peoples were shaved in their absence and without their 
consent. The Europeans midwived the socio-political destabilization and bloodshed in the 
Third World at the Berlin Conference. 
 “Despite all such attempts to exclude the African from the Conference, however, the 
identity of the African native became the central preoccupation of its deliberations over the 
question of systematizing territory”.6 In the indigenous and traditional Third World setting, 
                                                          
4
 Although Anghie argues that “France and Germany first developed the idea of holding the Conference; 
invitations were issued in three stages, first to Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United States; later to Austria, Russia, Italy, Denmark, Sweden and Norway; and finally to Turkey”. See 
Anghie, supra note 4 at 91, footnote 198. 
5
 At the end of the Berlin Conference, the European colonialists signed a treaty that is today known as the 
General Act of Berlin, 1885. This Act, among other things, legalized the European occupation of African 
territories. 
6
 See Anghie, supra note 4 at 94. 
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the act of drawing lines to demarcate boundaries was neither permissible nor common 
practice. Before the arrival of Europeans, indigenous frontiers in the Third World used to be 
naturally and traditionally identified. “The notion of boundary line, however, was not known 
in Africa, while the use of frontier zones was widespread. Reasons for this include the lack of 
demographic constraint and the existence of large number of natural separation zones, such as 
deserts and forests”.7 Between most African traditional communities, boundaries as lines 
separating States did not exist. There were frontiers in the form of zones of varying width. 
Unhealthy forests and deserts usually provided the frontiers of separation found in 
Africa...distinct cultural and political groups lived and operated side by side.
8
 It was probably 
at Berlin that the ignorance, hypocrisy, deception, and exploitative tendencies of European 
colonialists about the Third World played out most.  
 Having been blinded by political and economic gains, the colonialists apparently gave 
no regard whatsoever to the cherished diversities, heterogeneity, history, and realities of the 
colonial subjects. Various units of ethnic groups were coerced to co-habit in the same 
geographical territories with one another. The peoples of the Third World never participated 
in the division of their boundaries. The wishes and aspirations of Africans were not sought 
and obtained. “The products of this colonial fiat had little or no resemblance to pre-colonial 
territories and political identities. The colonial project proceeded as if Africa was a tabula 
rasa for the inscription of colonial values, whims, and interests. It was by colonial fiat that 
decisions were made as to whether a part of one ethnic group was to fall into Nigeria or 
                                                          
7
 See Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986) at  27. 
8
 See J.C. Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960: The Framework of an Emergent African 
Nation (London: Longman Group Limited, 1970) at 5. 
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Benin”.9 There was no free and genuine expression of the will of the people. A forum where 
the future and co-existence of a large group of people were discussed had no representation 
from the subjects of discussion. The Berlin Conference appears to be the height of disregard 
and derision of the Third World by the Europeans. The fact that African peoples were not 
represented at the Conference is pregnant with meanings. ...the colonial powers demonstrated 
a brazen show of nonchalance, even contempt, for the interests of Africans, given their failure 
to engage the latter in any meaningful dialogue or consultation”.10 It is this nature and 
character of the division of boundaries in the Third World by the Europeans that makes the 
whole exercise fundamentally illegitimate and unpopular and has largely given rise to the 
spate of civil and armed conflicts in the region. 
 However, the conflicts in the Third World are not only the products of colonial 
invasion of the territory. On their own part, Third World leaders have no doubt fanned the 
embers of destabilization of the territory. Apart from bad governance and corruption, they 
hide under the doctrine of uti possidetis to resist every attempt by the governed to determine 
their socio-political destiny. There are lots of disconnect and distrust between African States 
as political institutions and the citizenry. The needed socio-political cohesion is regrettably 
lacking. These anti-self-determination behaviors by Third World leaders have triggered 
armed conflicts across the region with their monumental losses.  
 
 Since the mid 1970s, tensions had been building up between Nigeria and Cameroon 
regarding sovereignty over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula until they finally culminated into 
armed conflicts that claimed lives and properties and displaced many others. The first major 
                                                          
9
 See Ikechi Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, & Global Order (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2003) at 27.  
10
 See Dakas C.J. Dakas, International Law on Trial: Bakassi and The Eurocentricity of International Law (Jos, 
Nigeria: St. Stephen BookHouse Inc., 2003) at 22 & 35. 
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use of direct violence in the form of military conflict took place on May 16, 1981. On that 
day, Cameroon’s national radio network service announced that three Nigerian military patrol 
boots had violated Cameroon’s territorial sovereignty by intruding into Bakassi up to the Rio 
del Rey River and opened fire on the Cameroonian Navy. Cameroonian soldiers responded 
and in the battle that ensued, five Nigerian soldiers were killed.  
 Taking the matter
11
 to the International Court of Justice in 1994 did not imply an 
automatic end to the armed conflict. Till date, various degrees of fighting continue to break 
out even after the determination of the case since 2002. One of the major incidents broke out 
in February 1996 when deploying an additional 1000 troops, Nigeria invaded and occupied 
Bakassi. This time, it seemed as if a full-fledged military combat was imminent in spite of the 
fact that the case was already before the ICJ. By May 1996, more than 50 Nigerian soldiers 
had lost their lives and several others taken prisoners. It was reported that in March 2013, 
there was an attack on Efut Obot Ikot which is one of the villages in the Bakassi Peninsula. 
According to reports, the attack which was alleged to be as a result of disputed fishing rights 
and payment of taxes left 5 people dead, 17 others missing, and 1,900 displaced.
12
 In October 
2002, the ICJ ceded the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and since then, sovereignty 
over the Peninsula has been vested in the Republic of Cameroon but skirmishes are still 
occurring in that territory necessitating the clamor by the Bakassi people for their right to 
self-determination. 
 Whereas the legal battle might have been won and lost at The Hague, several other 
challenges connected with the boundary dispute and the main issues that gave rise to it all 
merits an inquiry and thus forms part of the discourse in this thesis. Here, the thesis attempts 
                                                          
11
 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
Intervening), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep 303. 
12
 See the Nigeria’s Vanguard Newspaper report of 7 April 2013 titled: “Deaths in Bakassi: Nigerians in Ceded 
Territory accuse Cameroon of Breaching Pact” available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/deaths-in-
bakassi-nigerians-in-ceded-territory-accuse-cameroun-of-breaching-pact/. 
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to establish a nexus between the series of unconscionable treaties/agreements entered into 
between African Kings and the Europeans and the civil conflicts that have been threatening 
the co-existence of the two African States. The extent of the legal logic and soundness of the 
reasoning in the ICJ judgment in the Cameroon v. Nigeria border dispute is analyzed.  
 The right to self-determination is one principle of international law that has been 
enmeshed in so much controversy and politics owing largely to its character and tendency of 
altering the existing boundaries of a sovereign State. Nevertheless, the principle of self-
determination of peoples, as a liberating principle “has been recognized by the UN Charter 
and in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, and it is one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law”.13 In the separate opinion of Judge Dillard in the Western Sahara case, “it 
is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of 
the people”.14 Whereas the ICJ decisions in some of the Third World countries marked a 
significant shift in the various disputes, current events show that they have not been able, 
especially in the Nigerian and Western Sahara cases, to eliminate tension.  
 It is worrisome that since the commencement of the United Nation’s decolonization 
process across the Third World in the 1950s and 60s, some of the territories are still under 
foreign occupation and regional (re)colonization. The socio-political and legal logjam 
currently experienced in the North African territory of Western Sahara forms part of the 
inquiry in this thesis. Western Sahara, a territory that is rich in natural resources and hence 
economically and politically strategic to French, Spanish, and Moroccan interests - the people 
there have not been successful in their struggle to self-determine their political, economic, 
and social future. Since the 1975 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ concerning the Western 
Sahara’s socio-political stalemate, the people of Western Sahara are still under foreign 
                                                          
13
 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, [1995] ICJ Rep 90 at 29. 
14
 Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, [1975] ICJ Rep 12 at 122. 
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domination by neighboring Morocco. The Kingdom of Morocco has been frustrating all the 
moves by various stakeholders towards the conduct of an effective referendum in Western 
Sahara and yet surprisingly and ridiculously continues to sit in the World body as a member 
to deliberate on global peace and equality. In this vein, this thesis evaluates the “recovery 
mission” argument by The Kingdom of Morocco concerning the territory of Western Sahara. 
It traces the unilateral partition of the Mediterranean borders by France and the subsequent 
cession of the Sahara to its imperial ally – Spain; an act that the King of Morocco considered 
an assault on the prestige of the Sultanate.  
 The domination of East Timor (officially known as Timor-Leste) by Portugal as the 
colonial Power lasted for over four hundred years – about the longest in the history of the 
Third World peoples. When in 1975 the Imperialists retreated, East Timor was invaded by its 
neighboring Indonesia who massacred and brutalized the human population in the island until 
2002 when the people realized their right to self-determination with the assistance of the 
United Nations. 
 In using the colonial encounter and the principle of right to self-determination in 
international law to analyze the ICJ judgments in these three disputes, this thesis is divided 
into six chapters. The present chapter is the introductory part that gives an overview of the 
discourse that forms the entire study. Chapter two of the thesis focuses on the emergence of 
States in Africa. It is the overall objective of this chapter to situate the socio-political 
structure of pre-colonial and colonial African Kingdoms and Empires in the context of 
Arabian and European colonization. It examines the status quo ante that prevailed in Africa 
before the invasion of the continent by imperialists and demonstrates that Africa, contrary to 
the fables by the Europeans, contributed to the development of international law via 
commercial and diplomatic relations. The thesis attempts here to deconstruct the “civilizing 
mission” theory of the European Imperialists by demonstrating that Africa was already 
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sophisticated and civilized prior to their arrival. It highlights the nature and character of some 
Empires and Kingdoms in Africa and demonstrates how organized and popular they were. 
 The judgment of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the land and maritime 
dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria forms the nucleus of the discussion in chapter three. 
The introductory part serves as the gateway to the entire chapter. It introduces the people of 
Bakassi Peninsula, the nature of the disputed territory, and the peoples of Cameroon. The 
chapter proceeds to highlight the nature of the World Court at The Hague and gives a 
background to the dispute brought before it by Cameroon by situating the colonial encounter 
in the context of the various treaties entered into between the colonial Powers and the local 
Kings in the two States. Here, the thesis argues that the import of the treaties was nothing 
more than the protection of the colonial subjects contrary to the interpretation given to it by 
the ICJ and the weapon of dispossession that the imperial powers turned them to. It proceeds 
to outline the facts of the dispute, the legal issues involved, and the arguments of the two 
necessary State parties before the ICJ. The thesis brings out the holdings of the Court in the 
dispute and argues that the various treaties and agreements relied on by the ICJ to reach its 
conclusion were misinterpreted by the Court having not deciphered the intentions of the 
contracting parties from the ordinary and literal meanings of the words used. The thesis 
decries the disregard by the Court of the fate of the human population in the Bakassi 
Peninsula and submits that the judgment, far from being fair, succeeded in deepening the 
state of restiveness in the territory.  For the territory to experience lasting peace, the chapter 
concludes by making a case for the realization of a right to self-determination by the people 
of Bakassi. 
 Chapter four is devoted to the analysis of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the 
lingering dispute in Western Sahara. The objective of the chapter is to unmask the ignoble 
roles played in the nineteenth century by France and Spain in the balkanization of the 
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frontiers of the Mediterranean and its Sultanates in North Africa and to use relevant 
international instruments to argue for the right to self-determination in Western Sahara. A 
combination of that anti-Third World act by the colonialists and the illegal annexation of 
Western Sahara by the neighboring Morocco have brought the Third World to this present 
socio-political quagmire. The chapter examines the politics of economic interests being 
played by various States over the natural resources located in Western Sahara.  
Chapter five analyzes the Case Concerning East Timor between Portugal and Australia. It 
outlines the legal issue in the dispute and dissects the arguments of Portugal and Australia. It 
examines the politics of re-colonization in the Third World by Indonesia and the windy road 
to the realization of the right to self-determination by the East Timorese.  
Chapter six is a summary of arguments in the thesis, concluding remarks, and some 
recommended/proposed courses of action.  
 In sum, the common theme of this thesis is that the colonial encounter succeeded in 
bastardizing the peaceful co-existence of the Third World peoples and on the other hand 
introduced a tie that bound the colonial Powers in unity. By exhuming the historical factors to 
the conflicts, this research establishes a chain between the European commercial and political 
invasion of the Third World, the subsequent violence to the natural frontiers of the people, 
and the conflicts ravaging the territory. The thesis concludes that there could be dire socio-
political consequences where a fundamental decision concerning a group of people – like the 
cession of a territory is taken without their consent or regard to their history and future. Such 
an arbitrary decision has the semblance of curtailing a peoples’ right to self-determination. 
There is a need for a UN-organized referendum for the Bakassi inhabitants. To this end, the 
UN as a world body that strives to foster enduring peace across the globe should work with 
the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to achieve this purpose. With the uncertainty that 
has hitherto characterized the application of self-determination and the need for the growth of 
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international law in this area, it is high time that the ICJ took the bull by the horn to 
pronounce some degree of certainty on this principle.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA, EMERGENCE OF AFRICAN STATES, AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
Owing to the fact that a balanced analysis of this discourse requires a demonstration of what 
Africa looked like during pre and post European colonial encounter, this chapter reflects on 
the status quo ante that prevailed in Africa before the Europeans set their feet in the Third 
World soil. It also highlights the socio-political structure of pre-colonial and colonial Africa 
in the context of Arabian colonization and various political Empires and kingdoms in Africa. 
This chapter attempts to puncture the long and widely held but erroneous notion spread by 
the West that pre-colonial Africa had no history, did not contribute to the development of 
international law, and knew no organized socio-political and administrative setting. It argues 
that even before the periods of 6
th
 and 7
th
 centuries, Africa already had a number of well-
structured Empires and kingdoms that were conducting remarkable international relations 
with European countries. As Basil Davidson notes: “Some of these [African] States were the 
contemporaries of early medieval Europe, and may at times be accounted superior to it in 
civilization”.15 Even Pfaff concedes that “...but it seems fair to say that when the Europeans 
first came to Africa there were coherent, functioning societies of varying degrees of 
sophistication, some of great political subtlety and artistic accomplishments...This was 
destroyed by colonialism”.16 Apart from the Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations, which the 
                                                          
15
 See Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1970) at 79. For another 
coherent demolition of the superficial and mischievous claim of lack of political and administrative structure in 
Africa by the colonialists, see also Walter Rodney, How Europe Under-developed Africa (Nairobi: East African 
Educational Publishers, 1989) at 242. 
16
 See William Pfaff “A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa” (1995) 74 Foreign Aff. 2 at 3 & 
4. 
 11 
 
West acknowledges but denies their black African origin, other parts of the continent have 
long histories of developed State-societies. In West Africa, the Soninke kingdom has been 
traced to 300 A.D., as were the Tekrur and Madingo Kingdoms in Senegal and Mali, 
respectively. Between the ninth and sixteenth centuries, writers and travelers documented the 
sophisticated States and Kingdoms of ancient Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Benin, and others. Many 
of these States engaged in inter-State relations, including commerce, sometimes with traders 
from the Middle East.
17
 The chapter ends with a discussion of the general degree of politics 
and ambiguity that have characterized the application of self-determination in the Third 
World. 
 
2.1 The Arabian Colonization of Africa 
The first social, economic, and political assaults against Africa by way of colonialism were 
launched by the Arabs. In its bid to spread Islam, expand its military, and ultimately gain 
economic control, the Arabs in a war-like manner invaded Africa through Egypt, Tunisia, 
Libya, Algeria, and Morocco as well as the Empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. This was 
during the Umayyad caliphate.
18
 The Arab invasion of North Africa in the 7
th
 century 
accounts for the adoption of Arabic as the official language and Islam as the main religion, 
and thereby thrusting alien customs in almost all the North African States today. The Arab 
colonization of Africa with its introduction of Islam and occupation of North Africa by Arabs 
from Arabia marked the first damaging phase in the history of the African continent. In some 
                                                          
17
 Makau wa Mutua “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry” (1994-1995) 16 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 1113 at 1129. See also Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa; Cheikh Anta Diop, Pre-Colonial Black 
Africa. 
18
 The Umayyad is the Islamic ruling dynasty of the Caliph from 661-750AD located in the present day 
Damascus, Syria. It is believed that they descended from Mecca. 
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existing African States today, extremism and fanaticism in the garb of Islam have regrettably 
proved to be a source of destabilization of the society and polity. The Arab colonialists made 
good fortune from slave trade in south-east Africa by selling their victims and that was a 
significant destructive factor in the continent. In their bid to form strong alliances and 
enhance the flourishing of trade between the Egyptians and the Arabians including Iraq, the 
Arabians constructed a canal to link these territories. 
2.2 The Ghana Empire 
Located in the present day Mauritania and Mali, the Ghana Empire was reputed for its trans-
Saharan trade in gold, ivory, and salt and consequently its commercial relations with North 
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. As an organized monarchical government, taxes were 
collected by the Empire on goods. It had an established Army. “The capital was already a 
cosmopolitan and international city with Arab quarters and mosques. It had a large number of 
jurists and scholars. The Empire first opened itself to the world at large through commerce; it 
already enjoyed international repute...”19 But Arab merchants made good fortune in slave 
trade in Ghana Empire. The Ghana Empire was later conquered by the Sosso who 
consequently submitted to the Mali Empire. 
2.3 The Empire of Mali 
This was one of the renowned and wealthy Empires that reigned in Africa with sovereignty 
over a large territory. The emperor, Mansa Musa was recorded to have “exchanged embassies 
with Morocco, maintaining commercial and diplomatic ties with Egypt, Portugal, and 
Bornu”.20 It is strongly believed that the Empire had a well organized administration because 
                                                          
19
 See Cheikh Anta Diop, Pre-Colonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems 
of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States (Brooklyn, New York: Lawrence 
Hill Books, 1987) at 91. 
20
 See Diop, supra note 19 at 92. 
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Emperor Musa was recorded to have made “a celebrated pilgrimage to Mecca during the 
periods of 1324-1325”.21 This suggests that the Empire had international exposure and 
probably moved with an entourage. It operated an organized fiscal regime. This made it 
possible for Custom duties and taxes to be paid by merchants on their trades. The Empire of 
Mali maintained significant dignity in its relationship with Europe. 
 
2.4 The Songhai Empire 
The Songhai Empire was one of the largest Islamic empires in history and was located in the 
present day Niger and Burkina Faso. The Empire had an organized administration with 
mayors and provincial governors and a thriving commercial city of Timbuktu. There was a 
regulated economy as well as an effective criminal justice system with Islamic principles. 
There was a conventional university with scholars and skilled workers from Spain, Morocco, 
and Egypt. There were political, cultural, and diplomatic ties between the Empire and the 
Islamic world. Songhai Empire is recorded to be the first West African ruler to accept the 
exchange of ambassadors with Islamic States. The Empire was later conquered by Morocco. 
2.5 The Mossi Empire 
The Mossi Empire named after an ethnic tribe in the present day Burkina Faso reigned in the 
12
th
 century pre-colonial Africa and its Emperor was Moro Naba. It was one of the oldest and 
prestigious Kingdoms in West Africa. This was a highly structured and hierarchical political 
system with a constitution that provided, inter alia, for the process of nomination and election 
of the leaders of the Mossi nation including the Emperor. The Mossi Empire had what we 
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 Diop, Supra note 19 at 93. 
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refer to in some present day political settings as an electoral college.
22
 In effect, the people 
had a known voting pattern and ascendancy to the throne of the Empire was not automatic. 
The Nacomse are the ruling class and the Emperor is at the apex political hierarchy. The 
Mossi Empire had a very effective governmental structure with a Minister of Finance who 
was in-charge of the treasury of the Empire, a Mayor whose role included “introducing 
ambassadors and distinguished visitors”,23 an Army, as well as a legal system in place where 
people could seek redress. The character of this Mayoral position and role in the Emperor’s 
palace are indicative of the fact that there were diplomatic relations between the Empire and 
other parts of the world. 
 
2.6 The Kanem-Bornu Empire 
The Kanem-Bornu Empire was in existence in the present day Chad, Nigeria, some parts of 
Niger, and Libya with remarkable urban elite. The Arabs penetrated the Empire with Islam 
but this was not without resistance from the people who preferred their traditional beliefs and 
practices. This Empire had an established governance structure with special advisers and an 
organized Army. There was an active diplomatic relations between Kanem-Bornu and Tripoli 
as well as Egypt. Kanem-Bornu relying on Islamic law introduced some legal and 
administrative reforms and the Empire had international exposure as he made frequent visits 
to Mecca on pilgrimage. The Empire had a strong system of trade and economy and therefore 
participated in commercial activities in the trans-Saharan route. Government generated its 
revenue from tribute and customs duties. 
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 See Diop, supra note 19 at 43.  
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 See Diop, supra note 19 at 44. 
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 The foregoing lends credence to the fact that prior to colonialism, Africa already had 
well-established socio-political and administrative structures in forms of monarchical or 
quasi-monarchical governments. The peoples had “Constitutions” that served as guides on 
how governance ought to proceed. There were provincial governors, advisers to the 
governments, and many offices had tenure. Diop notes that “...but one can say without 
exaggeration that throughout the middle ages, Europe never found a form of political 
organization superior to that of African States”.24 
2.7 Africa, Self-Determination, and Uti Possidetis 
 “In the hands of would-be States, self-determination is the key to opening the 
 door and entering into that coveted club of statehood...In the Third World, we see an 
 increasing number of States, notably in Africa, to whom self- determination acted as 
 midwife at their birth into the international community, which are now engaged in the 
 wholesale destruction of any semblance of either internal or external commitment to 
 that concept”.25 
 The acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World was an extra-ordinarily significant 
event; and yet, various limitations and disadvantages appeared to be somehow peculiarly 
connected with that sovereignty. In any event, Third World sovereignty appeared quite 
distinctive as compared with the defining Western sovereignty.
26
 As Okafor noted, “The 
direct inheritance and preservation of the legacy of the colonial State, as well as the 
continuing construction of the post-colonial State on the incubus of its predecessor, has had 
important implications for the legitimacy of the post-colonial African State...the illegitimacy 
of the post-colonial State, in the eyes of the populations and groups that composed it, was 
                                                          
24
 See Diop, supra note 19 at 100. 
25
 Antonio Casesse, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (UK:  Cambridge University Press, 
1995) at 6. 
26 See Anghie, supra note 4 at 2. 
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inherited by the post-colonial State, and intensified by the somewhat dismal performance of 
many post-colonial African States”.27 
 ‘Many African States that exist today are themselves by-products of nationalist 
struggles in which the demand for self-determination, legitimated as an international norm, 
played a primary role in the transition from subordinate status to sovereignty. The de-
legitimation of the colonial order in the international arena led to the institutionalization of 
the principle of self-determination’.28 Yet, the process of the emergence of States in Africa 
has been engulfed in the miasma and caldron of controversy centering on the principle of 
territorial integrity of the parent States.  
 By way of a definition, a State in international law is to possess a “permanent 
population”, “a defined territory”, “a government”, and “the capacity to enter into legal 
relations with other States”.29 The least controversial mode of State creation is where consent 
of the parent State is given and this is rarely the case. Consent may be given politically, prior 
to the declaration of independence, or subsequently, after the declaration of independence has 
been issued.
30
 Across the continent of Africa, the history of emergence of African States have 
been characterized by violence, wars, displacements, gross human rights abuse, hunger, and 
diseases leading to under-development.  
                                                          
27
 See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation 
in Africa (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) at 33. 
28
 See Casesse, supra note 25 at 32. 
29
 See Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, which was signed at 
Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933 but took effect on December 26, 1934. 
30
 Jure Vidmar “South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence and 
Delimitation of New States” (2011-2012) 47 Tex. Int’l. L. J. 541, P. 545-46 (“After a lengthy civil war, Eritrean 
independence was accepted by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia...Although the internal political 
situation at that time was very complicated, it is nevertheless notable that from the perspective of international 
law, Eritrea became independent upon the previous consent of its parent State”). 
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 Over time and across the region of Africa, the concepts of sovereignty and self-
determination have played significant but opposite roles in the process of emergence and 
failure of States in the region. The emergence of States as a legal, political, and social 
phenomenon in Africa represents one of the major political developments and yet a source of 
conflict in the region owing largely to the selfish ambitions of political leaders. As Mgbeoji 
notes, “At the formal end of colonialism, the first generation of rulers in many post-colonial 
States tended to perpetuate the militarized concept of State security to secure their tenuous 
hold on power. Effective control over the newly ‘decolonized’ territories became a license to 
pillage the State and oppress the citizenry....The rule of ‘big men’ and thugs converted 
colonies into personal fiefdoms...By an adroit mixture of coercion and corruption of the 
domestic order and deft manipulation of the international security paradigm, tyrants held 
sway in their respective domestic domains”.31  
 The governments as institutions of the States hardly “conduct themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.32 This 
posture of some African States does violence to the proviso to the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law as it relates to the right to self-determination: 
 Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [referring to the right to self- determination] 
 shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
 or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
 independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of 
 equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
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 Ikechi Mgbeoji “The Civilized Self and the Barbaric Order: Imperial Delusions of Order and The Challenges 
of Human Security” in Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens, eds. International Law and 
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 possessed of a government  representing the whole people belonging to the 
 territory without distinction as to race, creed, or color.
33
 [Emphasis added]. 
 Many governments in the continent are not people-oriented and so serve the interest 
of only the privileged few in offices. They do not reckon with the plights of the governed but 
continually amass wealth for themselves and these have exacerbated the agitation for self-
determination. 
 The 1960s witnessed a harvest of emergence of African States. On the other hand, the 
early 1960s and 1990s also recorded a couple of unsuccessful attempts at self-determination 
and secession in Africa with the likes of Biafra, Ogoni and Zango-Kataf in Nigeria; the 
Katanga of Zaire – situations that claimed millions of lives in Africa. In many States of the 
continent, the hydra-headed challenges of civil wars, starvation, domination, displacement, 
dehumanization, and under-development largely and systematically orchestrated by the 
vestiges of colonialism and leadership challenges by Africans are crystal-clear. These 
recurring socio-political and religious crises have left Africa limping on the ladder of 
development, peace, and unity in the international plane. ‘...a historical, holistic and 
contextual examination of the norms and practices of African state-building will reveal that 
many of the problems associated with the present worrisome situation in Africa have roots in 
the structure of African states, as well as the frequent attempts by such states to amalgamate 
coercively Africa’s multitude of pre-existing political formations’.34  
 The closing of the political and economic shops of the Europeans in African soil was 
greeted with so much excitement by the former colonies. Africans had great hope for the 
rapid development of the continent. The joy of political and social independence resonated in 
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the hearts of Africans. To them, the realization of independence coupled with abundant 
human and natural resources in various African States marked the beginning of a great and 
pleasant turnaround in the socio-political and economic activities of the continent. But alas, 
‘Political independence was not followed by economic independence. A hostile global 
economy marginalized Africa and contributed to the failure of the post-colonial State’.35 To 
date, it is saddening that some parts of Africa have not really fared well in the international 
economic landscape. The juridical statehood attained with the decolonization of the colonial 
State has in the last four decades proven inadequate.
36
 There is little doubt that the only 
significant change at independence was not the restructuring of the State but the changing of 
the guard, the replacement of white by black faces in the State house.
37
  
 There are lots of disconnect and distrust between African States as political 
institutions and the citizenry. The needed political cohesion is lacking. Human and structural 
factors have been responsible for this disconnect. The continued crises in the African 
continent can be traceable to the “inability of the post-colonial African State to shed its 
colonial past, re-configure itself, and attract the primary allegiance of its constituent socio-
cultural groups”.38 For many African States, the moment of independence was also a moment 
of crisis because the post-colonial State was a direct successor and inheritor of the colonial 
State.
39
 To date, some provisions of English laws still form part of the corpus juris in some 
former British colonies in Africa. ‘At independence, flags and personnel changed in most 
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African States, but hardly any change occurred in the conduct of the business of governance. 
Having inherited flawed structural organizations, the post-colonial State lost an opportunity 
to shed its inherited illegitimacy’.40  
The post-colonial African States adopted some models of development that were the 
brainchild of the colonialists. Okafor noted that “the structural crises currently facing these 
post-colonial States stem from their structural illegitimacy. Such illegitimacy has derived, for 
the most part, from their lack of affinity with constituent sub-State groups and their origins as 
external impositions rather than organic entities created through an internal process of 
consensus-building.”41 The imperialists bequeathed to the post-independence regimes an 
established set of governing institutions designed to exploit indigenous people through strict 
authoritarian means, whose power in the colonial era was checked only by the sensitivities of 
the mother country. In hindsight, that inheritance did not augur well for the good governance 
of post-independence States, whose governments lost any check whatsoever on their 
authority. At independence, the former colonies typically adopted Western-style 
constitutions...
42
 African States were divided along ethnic lines and consequently experienced 
civil wars as different ethnic groups fought for control of the State. Many African States 
engaged in human rights violations and brutalities against the populace.
43
 This is partly owing 
to the fact that ‘...the right to self-determination was exercised not by the victims of 
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colonization but their victimizers, the elites who control the international State system... the 
instrument of narrow elites and their international backers.
44
 
Relying on the doctrine of uti possidetis in international law, most African leaders are 
unfavorably disposed to any attempt at the emergence of any other State within their 
territories. African leaders have used military, political, and socio-economic might to 
suppress the voices and aspirations of constituent groups who attempt to exercise the right to 
self-determination or secession. They guard their sovereignty jealously. This posture of 
African leaders has led to bitter consequences of civil conflicts and wars that have claimed 
millions of lives, witnessed gross human rights abuses, and led to under-development across 
the continent. The cases of some parts of Nigeria, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Former 
Zaire, Southern Sudan; the Hutu/Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, Casamance of Senegal, 
among others, come to mind. The strict application of uti possidetis (itself a colonial bequest) 
in Africa has contributed in destabilizing the continent rather than uniting it. 
 In this chapter, the study has attempted to highlight how advanced, organized, and 
popular many pre-colonial African States were even before the arrival of the colonial powers. 
It has also considered how the clamour for the right to self-determination has been 
orchestrated by Third World leaders. In the next chapter, it will be examining and analyzing 
how the colonization of Africa by the Europeans in Cameroon and Nigeria succeeded in 
institutionalizing unhealthy ethnic rivalry and conflicts between the two States. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BAKASSI PEOPLE, ICJ DECISION, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
3.0      Introduction 
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot 
ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each 
other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly 
where  the mountains and rivers and lakes were.
45
 
In those days we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we put it down at Old 
Calabar, and drew that blue line to Yola...I recollect thinking when I was 
sitting  having an audience with the Emir [of Yola], surrounded by his tribe, 
that it was a very good thing that he did not know that I, with a blue pencil, 
had drawn a line through his territory.
46
 
The above quotes are the accounts of two top former British officials on how the land 
and maritime borders between Cameroon and Nigeria were arbitrarily and unilaterally 
delineated in ignorance and disregard of the history, dynamics, and natural geography of the 
Niger are-later christened Nigeria. The above quotes reveal how the colonial powers gave no 
regard to the diversities and heterogeneity of Sub-Saharan Africa. The economic and political 
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invasion of Africa by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century has acquired notoriety for 
the lasting ‘legacy’ of catastrophe that it has continued to leave on the peoples of the 
continent. “The African territories which have attained independence and national 
sovereignty cannot, in a strict sense, be regarded as national States; they do not embrace one 
people with a common language, a common past, and a common culture; they are indeed the 
arbitrary creations of alien diplomats. The manner in which European nations descended on 
Africa during the closing years of nineteenth century in their scramble for territory was bound 
to leave a heritage of artificially contrived borderlines which now demarcate the emergent 
African States”.47 After many decades of attaining Statehood, it is poignant that Africa’s 
existence has been assailed by conflicts largely connected with land and maritime borders 
among its constituent States. This chapter provides background information to the underlying 
colonial and post-colonial factors that gave rise to the Cameroon versus Nigeria border 
dispute. It seeks to understand the role that the colonial project and its administrators played 
in the various disputes currently plaguing many African States using Cameroon and Nigeria 
as a focus. It examines how the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 under the auspices of some 
privileged European States and their subsequent artificial division of African boundaries 
succeeded only in institutionalizing conflicts and confusion in the Third World – in this case, 
Cameroon and Nigeria. It is the argument here that this ‘unhappy legacy of colonialism’48 has 
largely crippled development and rendered elusive the possibility of peaceful co-existence in 
these parts of Africa. This perspective and approach will hopefully assist in grasping how the 
issues in the Cameroon v. Nigeria border dispute evolved ab initio. This chapter introduces 
the people of Bakassi of Nigeria as well as the character of the disputed Peninsula called 
Bakassi. It also introduces the people of Cameroon that shares common boundary with 
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Nigeria. It proceeds to outline the facts of the Cameroon v. Nigeria border conflict as decided 
by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and the historical background to the conflict. 
Whereas the Cameroon v. Nigeria case was a three-pronged issue, namely – land boundary 
claim, a maritime delimitation claim, and a States responsibility claim; this study will largely 
concentrate on the land boundary claim. This is because the fundamental issue about the 
dispute basically centers on sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. The analysis of the legal 
issues and the ICJ decision follow. 
 
3.1 The People of Bakassi and the Disputed Peninsula 
The people of Bakassi are mainly the Efik, Efut, Ibibio, and Anang that forms part of the 
present day Calabar in Cross River State and some parts of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria. 
Predominantly farmers and fishermen, the population of the people of Bakassi is estimated to 
be from 150,000 to 300,000. The Bakassi Peninsula is an amphibious environment with 
abundance of water, fish stocks, and mangrove vegetation. Fishing is the major commercial 
activity in the Peninsula. Transportation around the Peninsula is by water. Bakassi Peninsula 
is located at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea consisting of the Bight of Bonny 
and Bight of Benin, and it is strongly believed to be rich in high grade crude oil deposits.
49
 
The total area of the Peninsula is approximately 700 square kilometers. The map below 
depicts Bakassi Peninsula bordering Nigeria and Cameroon. 
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 See “Nigeria, Cameroon Plan Joint Oil Exploration in Bakassi” on 
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  The map of Bakassi Peninsula bordering Nigeria and Cameroun 
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3.2 The People of Cameroon 
The Republic of Cameroon, with a population of over 19 million is located in central Africa 
and it shares border with Nigeria to the north and southeast, Chad to the northeast, and 
Equatorial Guinea to the south, among others. Cameroon’s coastline lies at the Bight of 
Bonny, part of the Gulf of Guinea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Previously a German colony 
(known as Kamerun) and later a French Mandate Territory, Cameroon have over 200 ethnic 
and linguistic groups. French and English are the official languages. The French-administered 
part of Cameroon gained independence in 1960. The Anglophone Southern part of the British 
Cameroons merged with it in 1961. 
 
3.3 The Nature of the International Court of Justice 
It is the purpose of the United Nations (“UN”) to inter alia,  
 “maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective and 
 collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, ...and to bring 
 about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
 international law, adjustment or settlement of international  disputes or situations 
 which might lead to a breach of the peace”.50 
 By virtue of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the ICJ was established in June 1945 as the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations to succeed the Permanent Court of International Justice.
51
 However, its 
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 See Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 NO 7. The Statute of the ICJ is 
an integral part of the Charter. 
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work did not commence until 18 April 1946 when it held its inaugural public sitting. The ICJ 
sits at the Peace Palace at The Hague, Netherlands. However, the Court can sit and exercise 
its functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.
52
 The Court is charged with 
the responsibility of settling, in accordance with the principles of international law, legal 
disputes brought before it by member States of the UN and to give advisory opinions on 
questions of law referred to it by some UN organs and specialized agencies.
53
 As a world 
Court, the ICJ has a dual jurisdiction and hence assumes jurisdiction in contentious cases 
brought before it by States and advisory jurisdiction at the instance of international 
organizations. The first case was brought before the ICJ in May 1947. The Court is composed 
of 15 Judges representing the principal legal systems of the world who are elected for terms 
of office of nine years each by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The full 
Court sits except when it is expressly provided otherwise in its Statute. However, the Court is 
properly constituted by nine Judges.
54
 The ICJ has a Registry which oversees the 
administrative duties of the Court. The Courts official languages are English and French. The 
sources of law that the ICJ applies are international treaties and conventions in force, 
international custom, the general principles of law, and judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists. In the light of the foregoing and for the purpose of the 
present study, the ICJ occupies a unique and significant position in the task of resolving post-
colonial territorial disputes in the Third World. In some cases, the Court has contributed 
positively in the peaceful resolution of disputes between warring States. But in some other 
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instances, the Court’s decisions have recorded some human rights abuses and armed 
conflicts. 
 
3.4 Historical Background to the Dispute 
 “Africa was sliced up like a cake, the pieces swallowed up by five rival nations – 
 Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Britain (with Spain taking some scraps) – and 
 Britain and France were at each other’s throats”.55 
To understand the present we must look into the past and to understand the future we must 
look into the past and the present. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, it is helpful to point out 
that the boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria is an offshoot of a historical 
framework in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which arose as a result of the 
colonialists’ act of dividing Africa amongst themselves, the changes in the status of relevant 
territories under the League of Nations mandate system, the UN trusteeships, and later 
Africa’s accession to independence.56 This history largely forms part of various conventions 
and treaties, diplomatic exchanges, administrative instruments, maps of the period, et cetera 
all of which were tendered in evidence to the Court by the parties to it. As Anene noted, “In 
view of the British and German entrenched positions in Calabar and Duala respectively, the 
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 See Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa 1876-1912 (New York, Random House Publishers, 1991) at 
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 The Mandate System of the League of Nations was an international regime created for the purpose of 
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arrangement succeeded the Mandate system after the Second World War. The trusteeship system ended in 1961. 
See Antony Anghie “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations” (2002) 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 at 514-5; See also 
Mutua, supra note 17 at 1137-38. 
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eastern end of the Nigerian coast was bound to become a subject of controversy between the 
two Powers. The neck and neck race for treaties between Hewett and Nachtigal had already 
created considerable confusion as to respective spheres of influence of the European Powers 
involved”.57 In the case of the Cameroons territory, for example, Britain had intended to 
acquire the region but before it had acted Germany signed a treaty with the local chief placing 
the territory under its protection.
58
  
 In the Third World regions, territory was basically acquired by way of entering into 
agreements of cession with local Chiefs and Kings. The Europeans’ inordinate scramble for 
Africa set the stage for series of conflicts and dispute of various dimensions and proportions 
across the continent. To the Europeans, “Africa, in the rhetorical metaphor of imperial 
jingoism, was a ripe melon waiting carving in the late nineteenth century. Those who 
scrambled fastest won the largest slices and the right to consume at their leisure the sweet, 
succulent flesh. Stragglers snatched only small servings or tasteless portions; Italians, for 
example, found only desserts on their plates”.59 “In the successive phase of the European 
partitioning of Africa, the lines demarcating spheres of interest were often haphazard and 
precipitately arranged. The European agents and diplomats were primarily interested in 
grabbing as much African territory as possible, and were not unduly concerned about the 
consequences of disrupting ethnic groups and undermining the indigenous political order.”60  
 In accordance with the functional socio-political organization of pre-colonial Africa, 
Bakassi as an already existing kingdom as early as 1450 was a constituent part of the Old 
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Calabar administrative and political enclave together with the Southern Cameroons. In the 
pre-colonial era, the city states of the Calabar region constituted an acephalous federation 
having independent entities with international legal personality; hence, it could enter into 
legal relationships with other international persons. In the colonial period, the Europeans 
entered into numerous treaties with indigenous rulers who were exercising control over 
identifiable areas of territory. “...a number of treaties of protection were signed consistent 
with traditional practice, i.e. granting the protecting State powers in the external field and 
quite often determining that the local ruler was restricted in his external relations by the 
consent of the protecting power”.61 On 10 September 1884, in the course of European’s 
scramble for Africa, Britain signed a Treaty of Protection with the Kings and Chiefs of Old 
Calabar. Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of 10 September 1884 provide that: 
 Article 1:    “Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, &c, in compliance 
   with the requests of the Kings, Chiefs, and people of Old Calabar,  
   hereby undertakes to extend to them, and to the territory under their 
   authority and jurisdiction, her gracious favor and protection”. 
 Article 2:   “The Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar agree and promise to refrain 
   from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any 
   foreign nation or Power, except with the knowledge and sanction of 
   Her Britannic Majesty’s Government”.62   
The letters and spirit of the 1884 Treaty reveals that it was nothing more than a Treaty 
of protection contrary to the claim that it is one of annexation and acquisition of territory. The 
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Treaty of Protection by Britain for economic motives was another colonial bond entered into 
by the Calabar monarchs with Britain to the extent that it got the local Chiefs not to enter into 
any kind of agreements or treaties with any other nation without the prior approval of the 
British Government. “...the regime of protectorates was more insidious than the regime of 
colonies. The regime of protectorates was a convenient mechanism employed by the 
colonizing powers to exploit Africa’s resources without being bogged down by the burdens 
of cost, manpower, etc. of local administration”.63  
The Anglo-German Treaty exposes the double standard and exploitation that are 
reminiscent of the European and Third World colonial relationship. John Westlake’s view 
concerning the nature and status of the various treaties entered into between African Chiefs 
and European Powers reveals the mockery and misrepresentation that characterized the 
colonial relationship. “In Africa...an importance has sometimes been attached to treaties with 
uncivilized tribes, and a development has sometimes been given to them, which are more 
calculated to excite laughter than argument”.64 Colonialism had only one hand – it was a one-
armed bandit.
65
 The Cameroon and Nigeria border dispute reflects the shrewd economic 
interests of the colonialists in the Third World that contributed to the under-development of 
the region and the development of Europe.  For instance, in 1890, when Britain and Germany 
decided on the Rio del Rey boundary, the Germans had wanted Bakassi to be given to them 
mainly to enable them develop  commercial shrimp fishing industry there, a request which 
the British Foreign Office did not approve. Consequently, Britain exercised control over the 
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entire territory of Old Calabar, part of which was Bakassi. In 1913, Britain purportedly ceded 
the Bakassi Peninsula to Germany who later bequeathed it to France. 
 Southern Cameroons was a constituent part of German Kamerun between 1885 and 
1916 until the end of World War 1 and the Treaty of Versailles that gave birth to the League 
of Nations. With the exit of Germany from African territory as one of the fall outs of World 
War 1, France and Britain were at daggers drawn as to who gets what from the booty 
obtained from Germany, with France carting home the larger portion of the spoil. The Berlin 
Conference of 1884-85 basically sought to ensure that Africa would be divided up among 
European powers on a systematic basis to minimize the potential for conflicts among 
European imperial powers.
66
 Pursuant to the provisions of the 1946 Order in Council, the 
regions placed under the British trusteeship were divided into two for administrative 
purposes, thereby giving birth to the Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. Owing 
to the British divide and rule system, the British Mandate system had the Northern Cameroon 
and Southern Cameroon under its trusteeship. Therefore, while Northern Cameroon was 
administered as part of the then Northern Nigeria, Southern Cameroon was administered as 
part of the then Eastern region of Nigeria with its headquarters in Enugu between 1922 and 
1961. The people of Southern Cameroon had 13 elected representatives in the Eastern Nigeria 
House of Assembly.
67
  But in August 1953, during a Constitutional Conference held in 
London, the Southern Cameroons through their elected representatives in the Eastern House 
of Assembly agitated for the right to self-determination from Eastern Nigeria – so as to 
become an autonomous region. Britain agreed to this agitation and consequently, Southern 
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Cameroon, by virtue of the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 became an independent quasi-
region with a regional Assembly having its capital at Buea, Cameroon. Again, on 11 
February 1961, the United Nations pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII) 
directed the British Government to organize a plebiscite for the Southern and Northern 
Cameroons to determine which country between Nigeria and Cameroun they would like to 
belong. While the people of Southern Cameroon voted to be part of the French Cameroun, 
the Northern Cameroon elected to become part of the Republic of Nigeria. Thus, Southern 
Cameroons officially became part of La Republique du Cameroun on 1 October 1961 while 
Bakassi continued to be part of Calabar in Nigeria. 
  
3.5 Facts of the Cameroon and Nigeria Case 
On 29 March 1994, Cameroon instituted a proceeding against Nigeria at the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”/ “The Court”) for the determination of sovereignty over Bakassi 
Peninsula and the course of maritime boundary between the two States.
68
 On 6 June 1994, 
Cameroon amended its application by including the question for the determination of the 
definite frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea and prayed the 
Court to consolidate the applications. Nigeria filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction 
of the Court and the admissibility of the application, among others. By virtue of Article 31, 
paragraph 3 of the Statute of the Court, Cameroon chose a Judge ad hoc, Mr Keba Mbaye 
while Nigeria chose Mr Bola Ajibola, both of the nationalities of their States.
69
 On 11 June 
1998, the Court ruled against the preliminary objection filed by Nigeria and found that it had 
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jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute and that Cameroon’s requests were 
admissible. 
 In a bid to protect its legal rights and interests in the Gulf of Guinea which could be 
adversely affected by the Court’s decision in the light of the maritime boundary claims 
advanced by Cameroon and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea relying on Articles 62 and 82 of the 
Statute of Court successfully filed an application to intervene in the case. Equatorial Guinea 
asked the Court “not to delimit a maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in areas 
lying closer to Equatorial Guinea than to the coasts of the two parties or to express any 
opinion which could prejudice its interests in the contexts of its maritime boundary 
negotiations with their neighbors...”70 
       
3.6 Legal Issues 
At the end of the First World War, all the territories belonging to Germany in the region, 
extending from Lake Chad to the sea, were apportioned between France and Great Britain by 
the Treaty of Versailles and then placed under British or French Mandate by agreement with 
the League of Nations. At the end of the nineteenth and the early part of twentieth centuries, 
Germany, France, and Britain entered into a number of agreements that delimited the 
boundaries of their respective colonies in Africa. The agreement between Britain and 
Germany respecting boundaries in Africa was first signed at Berlin on 15 November 1893 
and supplemented by another agreement of 19 March 1906 to cover the territories from Yola 
to Lake Chad. It is this agreement that is generally referred to as the Anglo-German 
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Agreement of 1906. Britain and Germany, in order to redefine the southern part of the 
boundary subsequently entered into two agreements for this purpose, namely: 
- the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 regarding the settlement 
of the frontier between Nigeria and Cameroons from Yola to the sea and 
the regulation of navigation on the Cross River; and 
- The Anglo-German Agreement of 12 April 1913 concerning the 
demarcation of the Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and the 
Cameroons from Yola to the Cross River. 
3.6.1   Arguments of Cameroon 
Relying on Articles XVIII to XXI of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1913, it was 
Cameroon’s contention before the ICJ that the Anglo-German Agreement fixed the course of 
the boundary between it and Nigeria in the area of the Bakassi Peninsula, thereby placing the 
Peninsula on Germany’s area of the boundary. For this reason, that upon Cameroon and 
Nigeria’s attainment of independence in 1960, this boundary became the border between the 
two successor States to the colonial powers and hence bound by the principle of uti 
possidetis. It was Cameroon’s contention that the 1884 Treaty between Britain and the Kings 
and Chiefs of Old Calabar established a colonial protectorate and in the practice of the period, 
there was little fundamental difference at international level, in terms of territorial 
acquisition, between colonies and colonial protectorates. Cameroon argued that substantive 
differences between the status of colony and that of a colonial protectorate were matters of 
the national law of the colonial Powers rather than of international law. 
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3.6.2 Nigeria’s Argument 
The Nigerian case concerning sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula was as follows: 
- That the 10 September 1884 Treaty only conferred certain limited rights 
on Britain, and in no way did it transfer sovereignty over Bakassi 
Peninsula to Britain. Nigeria argued that title to the Peninsula in 1913 
rested with the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and continued to reside 
with them until 1960 when the territory passed to the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria by virtue of attainment of independence. It was Nigeria’s 
argument that no amount of British activity in relation to Bakassi in the 
mandate or trusteeship periods could have severed Bakassi from the 
Nigerian protectorate. Nigeria therefore submitted that since no one could 
give what he does not have, Britain had no title in the Peninsula under 
international law to pass to Germany (nemo dat quod non habet). Nigeria 
urged the Court to hold that the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 
1913 which Cameroon is largely relying on is ineffective to the extent that 
it purports to have transferred sovereignty to Germany; 
- That Nigeria has had long, historical, effective, and peaceful occupation of 
the Bakassi Peninsula which goes to confirm and consolidate the original 
title of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, which title vested in Nigeria 
upon independence in 1960; 
- That the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 is incurably 
defective because it does violence to the Preamble of the General Act of 
the Berlin Conference of 26 February 1885; 
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- That under German contemporary domestic laws, all treaties providing for 
cession or acquisition of colonial territory by Germany shall be approved 
by the German Parliament - that since the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 
March 1913 involved the acquisition of a colonial territory like the Bakassi 
Peninsula, such acquisition ought to have been approved by the German 
Parliament but it never received the approval of the said Parliament;  
- That Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919 provides for 
the revival of pre-war bilateral treaties concluded by Germany on 
notification to Germany by the other party. It was Nigeria’s contention that 
since Britain took no steps under the said Article 289 to revive the Anglo-
German Agreement of 13 March 1913 that it accordingly abrogated the 
Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913. 
 
3.6.3 The ICJ Decision 
The Court noted that after the First World War, Germany renounced its colonial possessions. 
Under the Treaty of Versailles, the German possessions of Cameroon were divided between 
Britain and France. In 1922, Britain accepted the mandate of the League of Nations for that 
part [of the former German colony] of the Cameroons which lay to the west of the line laid 
down in the [Milner-Simon] Declaration signed on the 10 July 1919. Bakassi was necessarily 
comprised within the mandate. Britain had no powers to alter the boundary nor did it make 
any request to the League of Nations for any such alteration. The League Council was 
notified and it did not object to the British suggestion that it administer Southern Cameroon 
together with the eastern region of the Protectorate of Nigeria. 
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 According to the ICJ, when, after the Second World War and the establishment of the 
United Nations, the mandate was converted to a trusteeship, the territorial situation remained 
exactly the same. Therefore, for the entire period of 1922 to 1961 (when the trusteeship was 
terminated), Bakassi was comprised within British Cameroon. The boundary between 
Bakassi and Nigeria, notwithstanding the administrative arrangements, remained an 
international boundary. The Court rejected Nigeria’s argument to the effect that until its 
independence in 1960, and notwithstanding the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, 
the Bakassi Peninsula had remained under the sovereignty of the Kings and Chiefs of Old 
Calabar.
71
  
 The Court held that Germany ceased to exercise any territorial authority over 
Cameroun since 1916 and that Germany relinquished its title to its overseas possessions 
under Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, it was not necessary for 
Britain to take any step towards reviving the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 
with Germany. On the strength of that, the Court rejected the argument of Nigeria on that 
issue. 
On Nigeria’s historical and peaceful occupation of the Peninsula, the Court held that the 
invocation of historical consolidation cannot vest title of Bakassi in Nigeria considering that 
its occupation of the Peninsula was adverse to Cameroon’s prior treaty title.  
The Court concludes at paragraph 209 of the judgment that under the law at the time, Britain 
was in a position in 1913 to determine its boundaries with Germany in respect of Nigeria, 
including in the Southern section. The Court therefore upheld the validity and applicability of 
the entire Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 that delimited the boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria and consequently held by thirteen votes to three that “sovereignty 
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over the Bakassi Peninsula lies with the Republic of Cameroon”.72 The Court decided by 
fourteen votes to two that “the Federal Republic of Nigeria is under an obligation 
expeditiously and without condition to withdraw its administration and its military and 
Police forces from the territories which fall within the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Cameroon...”73 In the same vein, the Court unanimously decided that “the Republic of 
Cameroon is under an obligation expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any 
administration or military or Police forces which may be present in the territories which fall 
within the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Nigeria...”74  
 On 14 August 2008, following the Green Tree Agreement, Nigeria formally ceded 
Bakassi to Cameroon.
75
 Consequently, Nigerians in the Bakassi Peninsula would decide to 
either become Cameroonians or leave the territory. 
 
3.6.4    Analysis of the ICJ Decision 
 “Perhaps nowhere is the category of peaceful settlement of disputes more  imperative 
 than in territorial and boundary disputes between neighboring States, given the 
 potential for such disputes to escalate with destructive consequences for the States 
 concerned”.76  
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 In the Cameroon v. Nigeria land and maritime dispute, the Court relied largely on the 
Anglo-German Agreement of 1913 between Germany and France. The ICJ’s views in 
paragraph 207 of the judgment to the effects that the 1884 Treaty signed with the Kings and 
Chiefs of Old Calabar does not establish a protectorate and that Britain regarded itself as 
administering the territories comprised in the 1884 Treaty, and not just protecting them is in 
conflict with the view of Hewett.
77
 For instance, in response to the request of 1 July 1884 by 
King Jaja of Opobo for a clarification of the word “protection” in Article 1 of the draft 
Treaty, Hewett’s clarification of the import, object, and purpose of the Treaty is as incisive as 
it is helpful: 
 “I write as you request, with reference to the word ‘protectorate’ as used in the 
 proposed treaty that the Queen does not want to take your country or markets, but at 
 the same time is anxious that no other nation should take them. She 
 under[takes] to extend her gracious favor and protection, which will leave 
 your country still under your Government”.78 
 This direct clarification by Hewett lends credence to the fact that Britain did not 
intend to annex the area or assume total sovereignty over it. Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose”. The words of the treaty are abundantly clear and 
should have been given their literal and ordinary grammatical meaning. With the greatest 
respect, it is the ICJ who clearly went on a frolic of its own to invest the 1884 Treaty of 
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Protection with the status of cession, alienation, and dispossession. The request by King Jaja 
of Opobo was meant to eliminate any possibility of acting at cross purposes by the parties. 
 Judge Koroma, in his dissenting opinion, sees the ICJ’s view and interpretation of the 
1884 Treaty as “tantamount to a recognition of political reality rather than to an application 
of the treaty and the relevant legal principles...the approaches taken by the Court to reach its 
conclusions...are fundamentally flawed. The conclusion is with respect unsustainable. The 
findings are in clear violation of the express provisions of the 1884 Treaty and contrary to the 
intention of one of the parties to the 1884 Treaty  - that of the Kings and Chiefs of Old 
Calabar. This finding, in violation of the applicable treaty and clearly in breach of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, is not only illegal but unjust”.79 It more or less seems that 
the ICJ in this case was, in a roundabout way, repeating and giving more life to the theory by 
some European scholars to the effect that organized nations of peoples of non-European lands 
had no sovereign rights over their territories and thus no sovereign title by means of effective 
occupation. The proponents of this theory see the inhabitants of non-European territories as 
being merely in de facto occupation and not de jure occupation hence could be acquired by 
any State in accordance with the requirements of international law. For instance, scholars like 
Westlake posits that government is the international test of civilization and that those 
communities who are unable to furnish a government that meet the European standard could 
not hold effective title to territory.
80
 This theory, beyond the fact that it epitomizes the 
contempt and disdain with which Europeans viewed the Third World peoples, flies in the face 
of the sophisticated socio-political structure, organization, and civilization of Africans that 
pre-even the  6
th
 and 7
th
 centuries. It is a theory that does not hold water but only reveals the 
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relations of domination, subjugation, and inequality that characterized the nineteenth century 
European contact with the Third World. It goes to show how traditional histories of 
international law present colonialism and non-European peoples as peripheral concerns.
81
 
 The ICJ decision in this case goes to strengthen the conspiracy and unfairness of 
international law against the Third World peoples. It accentuates the fact that colonialism was 
central to the formation of the discipline of international law.
82
 It depicts how an institution of 
international law like the ICJ could be susceptible to Eurocentric prescriptions and 
manipulations. 
 Nigeria’s argument that it has had long, historical, and effective occupation of the 
Bakassi Peninsula which the Court dismissed as being adverse to Cameroon’s treaty title 
appears to conflict with the principle of international law on the acquisition of sovereignty 
over a territory. International law requires any entity which claims sovereignty over a 
territory to establish that it has used and occupied the territory in question. This is the 
decisive test for establishing sovereignty over territory.
83
 By placing much weight on 
Declarations, maps, charts, and reports, the ICJ engaged in “geographic Hegelianism”.84 
Bakassi has been a Local Government in Nigeria and has appeared as such in the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).  
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 Europe’s economic and political adventure in Africa has proved to be catastrophic to 
the continent. It has continued to pose threats of various dimensions to the peaceful co-
existence of Africa. It is surprising that the ICJ did not see beyond the issue of vesting the 
title of the Peninsula to Cameroon. In a well-considered judgment, the socio-economic and 
political future of the inhabitants of the territory should have enjoyed priority over (or at least 
rank pari pasu) with the issue of title. Till date, the Court’s decision succeeded in displacing 
and conferring alien and refugee status to thousands of Nigerians living in the Bakassi 
Peninsula. The Court’s decision will stand in history as one that compromised the human and 
socio-political rights of the inhabitants of Bakassi Peninsula. The socio-economic and 
political dislocation that the Court’s decision inflicted on the Bakassi population is counter-
productive and antithetical to Africa’s quest for peace, unity, and development. Numerous 
Nigerians who occupied the Bakassi Peninsula before the Court’s decision have been 
compelled as a consequence of the decision to become foreigners and refugees on their 
ancestral and historical land contrary to their desires. As at October 2014, it is estimated that 
3,200 Bakassi people displaced as a result of the ICJ’s judgment are still in refugee camp.85 
This number includes men, women, and children who now live in squalor and unhealthy 
conditions and whose hope of getting basic education appears dim. The ICJ decision showed 
no regard whatsoever to the people who have occupied their cherished ancestral lands and 
have shared common values, cultures, identity, religion, languages, and systems of education 
for centuries. The Court’s decision has foisted a state of confusion and uncertainties on the 
Bakassi inhabitants in the light of the displacement and relocation that it has necessitated. 
 The ICJ decision in the Cameroon v. Nigeria boundary dispute stands in history as 
one that exposed the Bakassi inhabitants to the whims and caprice of the Cameroonian 
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gendarmes who allegedly invades the civilian population - looting their properties and raping 
their women. For instance, it was reported that in March 2013, there was an attack on Efut 
Obot Ikot which is one of the villages in the Bakassi Peninsula. According to reports, the 
attack which was alleged to be as a result of fishing rights and payment of tax left 5 people 
dead, 17 others missing, and 1,900 displaced.
86
 This is apparently in gross violation of part of 
the Court’s unanimous decision which “takes note of the commitment undertaken by the 
Republic of Cameroon at the hearings that faithful to its traditional policy of ‘hospitality and 
tolerance’, it will ‘continue’ to afford protection to Nigerians living in the [Bakassi] 
Peninsula and in the Lake Chad area”.87 If these allegations of hostilities and unlawful acts 
are established against Cameroon, the Court’s decision does not provide for any penal 
measure or reparation. Since the decision was given by the Court, it has continued to further 
fratricidal rivalry between the parties in the Peninsula.  
 The present reality on ground is that the ICJ decision in Cameroon v. Nigeria land and 
maritime dispute has proved to have fallen short of stemming the tide of carnage and 
bloodletting that has become a recurrent feature in post-colonial Africa. How could the 
sovereignty of a people be successfully transferred by treaties, conventions, and Court 
decisions without giving regard to the interest and fate of the human population? The ICJ 
decision has once again echoed the charge against international law of its undemocratic 
nature. Flowing from the fact that the Peninsula has hitherto been occupied by Nigerian 
nationals and Cameroon’s declaration that there are over three million Nigerians in 
Cameroon, the decision prides itself as one that has no regard to the interest and welfare of 
the Bakassi people as well as one that promotes continual conflict and unrest in the Bakassi 
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Peninsula. In reality, the Court’s decision regrettably undermines Article 2, paragraph 3 of 
the UN Charter which provides that “all members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered”. As Judge ad hoc Ajibola stated it in his dissenting opinion: “A clear picture of 
the situation in Lake Chad is that the inhabitants have been living at large regardless of 
where the boundary lies, and some of them have been there for many years. It is precisely a 
situation like this that calls for justice in favor of these inhabitants, most of whom owe 
allegiance to Ngala local government in Nigeria and their Nigerian Bulamas (Chiefs)”.88 
The decision is far from deepening our understanding of the principles of public international 
law. By virtue of the ICJ decision, the control and management of land, including the sea are 
vested in Cameroon thereby depriving the Bakassi people of their source of livelihood – 
fishing and disconnecting them from their historical ways of life.  
 The ICJ’s decision in Cameroon v. Nigeria is a reflection of the role that international 
law and its institutions played in the colonization of Africa and are seemingly playing in its 
neo-colonization. In handing down its decision in this case, the Court which is an organ of the 
United Nations and an institution of international law has demonstrated its predatory 
character of advancing colonial legacies and projects. By virtue of the Court’s decision, the 
ICJ as an institution of international law has spoken in a clear way that it has all that it takes 
to be used as an instrument of dehumanizing the Third World. International law has once 
again allowed itself to be used to “legitimize colonial exploitation”. The ICJ’s decision here 
is an indication that the “ghost of Berlin Conference”89 is still haunting the Third World. In 
the case of ceding a territory by one State to another, the concerned States ‘are duty-bound to 
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ascertain the wishes of the population concerned, by means of a referendum or plebiscite, or 
by any other appropriate means that ensure a free and genuine expression of will’.90  
 In the light of the status of jus cogens in international law, any inter-State agreement 
(for instance, the Green Tree Agreement ‘GTA’)91 that is contrary to the will of the 
population concerned would fall foul of the principle of self-determination. If the population 
inhabiting a territory that is to be transferred is not consulted before the exercise, then ‘the 
treaty providing for the transfer of territory would be contrary to jus cogens and therefore 
could be declared null and void (if, of course, one of the contracting parties raises the issue 
before the International Court of Justice, under Article 66(a) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties)’.92 
 In the estimation of the international community, the Cameroon v. Nigeria border 
dispute has been legally resolved but the decision is laced with practical difficulties. 
Considering the fact that the decision to cede Bakassi did not give regard to the freewill of 
the people who are indigenous to Nigeria, contemporary events in the world suggests that the 
dispute over Bakassi Peninsula might not have been conclusively determined on the basis of 
the Anglo-German Treaty and the ICJ decision. In view of the tensed atmosphere that the ICJ 
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decision has been generating in the Peninsula, “international law might be on trial”. For 
instance, Scotland decided, though unsuccessfully, to revisit the Union treaty with England 
after 300 years. Again, the events in Crimea vis-à-vis the Russian population in Crimea have 
exposed the challenges in not affording the people the opportunity to exercise their right to 
self-determination. In the 1990s, Iraq led by Saddam Hussein attempted to reclaim Kuwait. 
These events go to buttress that it is difficult to alienate a people from their heritage, root, and 
ancestry. The restiveness in the Bakassi Peninsula sends a message to the international 
community that it is against public policy to arbitrarily uproot a people from their ancestral 
lands and expropriate their properties with impunity. It may not be surprising if the leaders of 
another generation in Nigeria decide to re-visit the issue and this, with its security and 
humanitarian consequences, could pose a challenge for the Third World and the UN. This is 
because the ICJ decision in this case has the tendency to create “bad blood and eternal 
acrimony” between the two States. 
 
3.7 The Bakassi Peoples’ Clamor for the Right to Self-Determination 
“Had the new African States decided upon independence to embark upon a 
general rearrangement of territorial borders, as at one time seemed not 
improbable, the question of the nature of the colonial acquisitions would be of 
little actual value. However, the colonially defined frontiers were reaffirmed 
and upheld. Therefore, the process of colonial delimitation and title remains 
relevant, particularly with respect to the large number of boundary disputes 
existing in modern Africa. The parties to such conflicts invariably base their 
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claims upon European treaties and the validity and extent of such treaties can 
have important repercussions today”.93    
 In obedience to the ICJ decision, Nigeria as a State has renounced its sovereignty over 
Bakassi Peninsula. However, the Nigerian inhabitants in the Peninsula have rejected the 
decision as they strongly consider the Peninsula their ancestral land, hence opposed to the 
plan of being relocated to Cameroon. Government must be based on the consent of the 
governed lest its legitimacy will be brought to question. “People should be ruled by their own 
consent, should play commensurate roles in government, should have a government of their 
choice and should determine their political, economic and social future”.94 People should be 
free to choose their sovereign and no longer to be battered about from sovereignty to 
sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.
95
 Coincidentally but 
regrettably, the import of the ICJ decision has found the people of Bakassi in a situation 
where they are battered from Nigeria to Cameroon with no regard to their socio-political, 
economic, and legal rights and interests. 
 The alleged incessant harassment of the inhabitants of Bakassi by Cameroonian 
authorities presumably in the course of the latter’s exercise of sovereignty over the territory, 
and the socio-economic dispossession and displacement of the people have largely prompted 
the people of Bakassi’s agitation for self-determination. Consequently, on 9 July 2006, in 
what appears to be an exercise of the right to self-determination, and sensing that their future 
looks bleak, some groups of Bakassi and Niger-Delta indigenes organized themselves under 
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the umbrella bodies of the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO), Bakassi 
Movement for Self-Determination (BAMOSD), and the Movement for the Emancipation of 
Niger Delta (MEND) and declared a “Democratic Republic of Bakassi”. But again, the right 
to self-determination does not inure to a people automatically. Being what it is – an 
expression of the popular will, machineries need to be put in place such as an organized 
plebiscite where the concerned people will freely express their desires towards this end as one 
of the prerequisites to the realization of self-determination. This is because since the principle 
of self-determination was formulated in the second half of the eighteenth century, it has been 
partly understood as a criterion to be used in the event of territorial changes of sovereign 
States that interested populations should through plebiscites have the right to choose which 
State to belong to.
96
  
 The right to self-determination of a people is one principle of international law that 
has been enmeshed in so much controversy, ambiguity, and politics owing largely to its 
character and tendency of altering the existing boundaries of a sovereign State and its 
vagueness in international documents. For instance, there are various judicial and scholarly 
formulations of ‘a people’. One of the purposes of the UN is “to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take the appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.97 Article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that: “All peoples have the 
right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.98 The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights provides that: “All peoples have the right to existence. They 
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shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely 
determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen”.99 Flowing from the above provisions, the 
components of the right to self-determination is that the concerned people should freely 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development and enjoy fundamental human rights. 
These provisions are broad as it does not restrict the right to self-determination to only 
colonized or oppressed peoples but encompasses all peoples. However, they fall short of 
defining who qualifies as “all peoples”. In what appears to be close to the meaning of a 
people, the Permanent Court of International Justice (the predecessor to the ICJ) gave a 
feature of a people seeking self-determination as “a group of persons living in a given a 
country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united 
by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a 
view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the 
instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of 
their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other”.100 
 The Supreme Court of Canada also gave a clue to the meaning of ‘a people’ when it 
held that: 
 “It is clear that a people may include only a portion of the population of an 
 existing States. The right to self-determination has developed largely as a  human 
 right, and is  generally used in documents that simultaneously contain  references 
 to “nation” and “State”. The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that the 
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 reference to “people” does not necessarily mean the entirety of a State’s 
 population”.101 
 As Okafor noted, the essential criterion for delimiting a people is their feeling of 
belonging, a common consciousness and a desire to maintain one distinct identity.
102
 
Umozurike notes that “self-determination applies to all peoples, whether in metropolitan or 
colonial territories and whether they are minorities or majorities. It applies to all people with 
an identifiable interest that may be geographical, cultural, professional or other; the larger 
the number of people involved, the easier it is to identify their right”.103 Therefore, it is 
submitted that the people of Bakassi who occupy common geographical location and share 
common history, origin, culture, linguistics, race, religion, interests, and destiny satisfies the 
requirements that should attract the right to self-determination in international law. 
Additionally, the agitation of the Bakassi people to the right to self-determination does not 
appear to do violence to the sovereignty of Cameroon nor Nigeria, neither does it 
significantly impair the frontiers of any of the two States. The territorial dispute between 
Cameroon and Nigeria highlights the grave consequences of the acts of Europeans whose acts 
of dividing Africa was devoid of the appreciation of the heterogeneity, values, and dynamics 
of the continent. In the context of boundaries, lines and maps are things of obscurity to 
African territories. Boundaries were identified by features like trees, rivers, mountains, etc. 
Even Malcolm Shaw agreed that “In the process of the European colonization of Africa, 
ethnic considerations were, in general, ignored and the colonies and protectorates included 
within their borders, with few exceptions, large numbers of different, often antagonistic 
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tribes, while dividing others between different jurisdictions”.104 However, Shaw quickly 
made a volte face by saying that: “this should not be taken to mean that no account was taken 
of local conditions in the delimitation of colonial frontiers in Africa. While some 30 per cent 
of the total length of African borders follows geometrical lines and thus would appear to have 
been established irrespective of local conditions, the majority of the borders were delimited, 
partly at least, in the light of some indigenous factors”.105 This appears to be in defense of the 
Europeans’ destabilization of Africa and a cover up, or at best an afterthought. The manner of 
demarcation of African boundaries by the Europeans was a calculated attempt to foster peace 
amongst the warring factional States of nineteenth century Europe and destabilize Africa. 
 This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the Europeans brazenly balkanized 
and mutilated African borders and the attendant socio-economic and political challenges such 
act has continued to pose on the peaceful co-existence of the continent. It has also dissected 
the ICJ judgment in the Cameroon v. Nigeria border dispute, its reasoning, and post-effects 
on the peaceful co-existence of the peoples of Bakassi Peninsula. The next chapter will be 
examining the lingering struggle for the realization of the right to self-determination, 
‘suspended decolonization’, and the colonial legacy of instability in the North African 
territory of Western Sahara. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 SELF-DETERMINATION, ‘SUSPENDED’ DECOLONIZATION, AND THE 
COLONIAL LEGACY OF INSTABILITY IN WESTERN SAHARA 
 
4.0    Introduction 
 
  “We rebelled against the English; we rebelled against the French... 
  We rebelled against those who colonized our land and tried to enslave  
  us... 
  We repeated the red revolutions many times and we continued with our  
  white revolutions over a number of years... 
  And for this we endured so much suffering, sustained so many losses,  
  and sacrificed so many lives... 
  [But] 
  When we finally gained our liberty, we began to sanctify the borders  
  they had instituted after they had divided our land...And we forgot that  
  these borders were but the boundaries of the ‘solitary confinement’ and  
  the ‘house arrest’ which they had imposed upon us!”106 
 
 The right to self-determination of a people is one principle in international law that is 
continually characterized by a clash between two other powerful sets of principles in the 
domain of international law– sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing States. The 
tension between these competing forces has generated and will continue to generate strife and 
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periodic doctrinal eruptions. Its ideological origins render it a multifaceted but also an 
extremely ambiguous concept. It has been instrumental in the principal tremors, even quakes, 
of contemporary international relations.
107
  “It is the right of all peoples to freely determine 
their political status and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.108 
“It is a phrase loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I 
fear, cost thousands of lives...”109  
 From the Northwestern geographical front of Africa, the territory of Western Sahara 
was one of the destinations of European commercial and political explorations and 
exploitations of Africa clothed in the garb of colonialism. The economic crisis in Spain 
largely spurred it into taking up Colonies in Africa. “The first phase of [European contact 
with the Third World peoples] took place through trading companies which confined their 
activities principally to trade; as they gradually adopted a more intrusive role in the 
governance of the non-European State in order to further their trading interests, more 
demands were made on non-European States, which were compelled under threat of military 
action to make increasing concessions to the interests of the traders”.110 In Portugal and 
Spain, perhaps more than in any other European State, colonies were seen as a condition for 
economic survival. Spain used the Moroccan and Saharan territories to advance its economic 
interests by floating shipping, railway, mining, and fishing firms through the now insolvent 
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Spanish company – Compania Transatlantica.111 These were after the Arab invasion of 
Western Sahara and the disruption of the way of life of its people with the introduction of 
Islam and Arabic. After the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the North African territory of 
Western Sahara, formerly known as Spanish Sahara, was one of the few ‘juicy scraps’ that 
fell for Spain as a colony from 1884 to February 1976. By the summer of 1886, Spanish 
geographers and scientist had traversed the length and breadth of the territory of Western 
Sahara making topographical and geographical findings regarding the richness of the 
territory. Owing to their nomadic lifestyle and difference from the settled and regulated life 
that the colonialists were imposing on the people, the colonial encroachment and intrusion of 
Western Sahara by Spain after the Berlin Conference was not without fierce resistance by the 
indigenous Saharawi people. However, with French military assistance, Spain was able to 
prevail and gain full control over the territory. Thus, Spain took Western Sahara as its colony 
in 1884. But in 1974, Spain bowed to pressure by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations for a referendum aimed at decolonizing the people, hence withdrew as a colonial 
Power from the Sahara.
112
 On account of the vacillating stance of Morocco and Mauritania, 
the proposed referendum which was aimed at realizing the right to self-determination of the 
people of Western Sahara was technically aborted or suspended. Sensing that the persistence 
of a colonial situation in Western Sahara jeopardizes the fragile stability and harmony in this 
part of Africa, the UN General Assembly by virtue of Resolution 3292 of 13 December 
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1974,
113
 sought the opinion of the ICJ regarding the status of Western Sahara at the time of 
Spain’s colonization of the territory in 1884.  
 About forty years ago, the ICJ, in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion,
114
 affirmed 
the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, but the realization of this 
right has hitherto remained a mirage. Morocco, supported by USA, France, and Spain (as 
well as the Arab League) continues to be in de facto occupation of two thirds of Western 
Saharan territory including all the major cities and natural resources. On the other side of the 
conflict is the Polisario Front, a liberation movement having its base in Algeria and whose 
main aim is the independence of Western Sahara proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (“SADR”) in 1976 and enjoys the support of Algeria and Russia. The SADR 
controls about 20-25% of Western Saharan territory. Whereas SADR has been a member of 
the African Union (“AU”) since 1984 and currently maintains diplomatic relations with about 
40 States in the world – mainly in Africa and Latin America, Morocco ceased to be a member 
of AU in 1984 after staging a walk out in protest of the admission of SADR into the Union. 
The decision of AU to admit SADR into its fold is hinged on the Union’s “absolute 
dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent”115, 
“respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right 
to independent existence”116, “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa”117; its 
conviction that “it is the inalienable rights of all people to control their own destiny”118; and 
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that colonially inherited borders are sacrosanct. In 2007, the Kingdom of Morocco proposed a 
self-governing status under Moroccan sovereignty with some degree of autonomy for the 
people of Western Sahara. The proposal was laid before the UN Security Council but was 
met with opposition from the Polisario Front.  
 The conflict in Western Sahara appears to have defied all regional and international 
tonics. This appears to be traceable to Spain’s wrong course of action in handing over the 
territory to Morocco and Mauritania instead of following the course of decolonization 
mapped out by the UN General Assembly and affirmed by the ICJ. The Kingdom of Morocco 
appears to be delighted in taking undue advantage of the Sahara people apparently due to 
economic interests as well as to boost national pride. Regrettably, the Third World is now 
faced with modern but internal colonization.  
 This chapter examines the colonial legacy of instability systematically designed and 
orchestrated by Spain and France in the territory of Western Sahara and North Africa at large. 
In the light of the colonial encounter with Western Sahara, this chapter uses the Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ in the Western Sahara territorial dispute to interrogate the bizarre and 
reprehensible status quo existing in the area. To what extent, if any, has the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion in the Western Sahara dispute given significance to the right to self-determination of 
the concerned people? Since the right to self-determination entails the right of a people to 
participate in their own government, to what extent is this self-imposed sovereignty by 
Morocco on the people of Western Sahara respectful of this right? This chapter explores and 
analyzes the roles of the various dramatis personae
119
 in the whole legal, socio-political, and 
economic imbroglio. What are the factors that Morocco is relying on to lay claim to the 
Saharan territory? How can the people of Western Sahara be extricated from the fangs of 
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modern and internal colonialism? It attempts to address the question of whether there is a 
responsibility expected to be borne by the UN beyond the submission of a question for 
advisory opinion to the ICJ and beyond forming various special decolonization committees, 
regardless of the fact that the ICJ’s advisory opinion lacks a binding character. Are there 
some interest-based politics going on at the Security Council over the Western Sahara 
impasse? Could this be another instance of a failure of international law? 
 
4.1 Historical Background 
The disputed territory of Western Sahara is located in North Africa in the coast of the 
Atlantic Ocean. It is bordered by Morocco in the north, Algeria in the east, and Mauritania in 
the east and South. Western Sahara forms part of the Sahara desert. Consistent with their 
characteristic ‘slicing’ of African territories, the European colonialists, in this case, Spain and 
France, divided the borders of Western Sahara by ratifying various treaties and agreements 
with the local Chiefs in 1900, 1904, and 1912 respectively. 
 Western Sahara is rich in high quality phosphate and it is widely believed that the 
territory is naturally blessed with iron ore, uranium, titanium, and potential oil and gas 
deposits. It is estimated to have a population of over 554,795 with the two dominant ethnic 
groups being the Arabs and Berbers.
120
 
4.2 Pre-Colonial Morocco and the Origin of Instability 
The formal history of the Kingdom of Morocco as a socially, religiously, and politically 
organized State dates back to as early as 6
th
 century BC just before the Arab colonization of 
North Africa. Although Moroccan statehood might not have conformed to the European 
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notion or norm of a State, Morocco was largely occupied by the Berbers.
121
 The Moroccan 
State/Empire was ruled by various dynasties; but Morocco was conquered by the Arabs in the 
early 8
th
 century AD and ruled by various sultanates. “The origin of the conflict in Western 
Sahara dates back to the colonial legacy and to disagreements over the Saharan borders 
drawn when Morocco and Algeria gained independence in 1956 and 1962. When the French 
and Spanish governments divvied up the Sahara, they established zones of influence that later 
became State borders”.122 Owing to the strategic location of Morocco in North Africa, France 
showed significant economic interest in it as early as 1830. Pursuant to the Treaty of Fez
123
, 
Morocco became a French protectorate in 1912. By virtue of the French protectorate over 
Morocco, France in a bid to consolidate on the European scramble for African territories, 
took undue advantage of such power to surreptitiously partition the territory of the Sultanate 
and ceded the far north on the Mediterranean and the south bordering the Spanish Sahara to 
Spain. Thus, in the usual European predatory character over the Third World territories and 
by virtue of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1900 and 1904, France and Spain created a Spanish 
protectorate in Morocco on 27 November 1912. Spanish economic interest in the Sahara can 
be traced to the pre-1700s when it planned to use it as a port for slave trade and commercial 
fishing. 
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4.3 The United Nations, the Project of Decolonization, and the Politics of 
Economic Interests 
 
Since the succession of the defunct League of Nations by the United Nations in 1945, more 
than 80 former colonies comprising about 750 million people have attained independent 
status. However, there remains about 16 Non-Self-Governing Territories (“NSGT”), 
consisting of almost 2 million people across the Third World States that are yearning to be 
decolonized. Of this number, Western Sahara which was designated by the UN as a NSGT in 
1963 is the most populous territory on the list of United Nations’ NGST and the largest in 
area. NSGTs are “...territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government...”124 Almost all of this number desires to exercise their right to determine their 
political, social, and economic status and future but are being frustrated by either the 
administering powers or other internal or external forces. Consequently, there are lots of 
essential jobs left undone by the UN by ways of dialogue, diplomatic pressure, and sanctions, 
if need be. In 1990, the General Assembly proclaimed the first International Decade for the 
Eradication of Colonialism. In 14 December 2010, it marked the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and peoples. Various UN 
Special Committees on Decolonization exist with the mandate to continue to negotiate for the 
freedom of the Dependent Territories and peoples. But these, in and of themselves, are not 
enough if we are to see the speedy realization of the right of the concerned peoples to self-
determination. Numerous resolutions have been passed by the UN General Assembly 
concerning the decolonization of the Western Sahara but these will prove to be mere rhetoric 
and paper works unless they are backed by stronger practical commitment to this significant 
process. “The international community’s indecisiveness and unwillingness to exert pressure 
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on Morocco and the SADR otherwise perpetuates the present status quo”.125 The Security 
Council has failed to wield the big stick against Morocco under Article 41 of the UN Charter 
apparently owing to the fact that USA and France – two influential members of the body 
appears to beneficiaries of the conflict in the area of trade relations with Morocco.
126
 The 
West – USA, France, Spain, and Russia, through the supply of arms continues to profit from 
the armed conflict between Morocco and the Polisario movement over Western Sahara. 
Morocco’s illegal occupation of the Western Sahara appears though regrettably to be 
enjoying the full support of USA owing to the latter’s economic interest in the Mediterranean 
at the expense of the right to self-determination of the large population in the Sahara.  
Morocco is a long-time Third World ally of the USA. Morocco is a leading trade partner of 
France. France is also the second biggest creditor of Morocco after the World Bank. The right 
to self-determination as a jus cogens rule presupposes that a people based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and fair equality of opportunity have the right to freely choose their 
sovereignty and political status with no external compulsion or interference. The imposition 
of Moroccan illegal sovereignty on the people of Western Sahara not only negates the 
Charter, ideals, and resolutions of the UN and the freely expressed will of the human 
population in the territory but it also undermines Woodrow Wilson’s famous speech on self-
determination that: 
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 “National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and 
governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase; 
it is an imperative principle of action....”127 
 In the interest of global peace, it is high time that the United States and France 
desisted from fanning the embers of violence and conflict in the Third World region for their 
commercial and economic gains. Again, the sitting over of and allocation of the natural 
resources that are located in the soil of Western Sahara by Morocco which are not in the 
interest of the people of Western Sahara violates an essential component of self-
determination – economic self-determination. 
4.4 Grounds for Morocco’s Annexation of Western Sahara 
Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara is predicated on historic title that predates Spanish 
colonialism of the Sahara. Thus, Morocco considers the division of its territory into French 
and Spanish protectorates in 1912 and subsequent occupation and colonization of Western 
Sahara by Spain in 1884 as a colonial amputation and robbery against it in view of the fact 
that it impaired its territorial sovereignty as a prominent Kingdom. In the light of this, 
Morocco considers its present annexation of Western Sahara as a “successful” recovery 
mission. “The Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara was not spurred, as many observers 
have assumed, by a simple lust for its phosphates. Rather, an ideology of territorial 
expansion, founded on the ideal of recreating a supposed “Greater Morocco” of pre-colonial 
times, was deeply rooted in the Moroccan psyche”.128 Morocco’s continued sovereignty over 
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Western Sahara is in keeping with the declaration of King Mohammed V in 1958 that 
Morocco would do everything possible to recover the Sahara.  
 The Kingdom of Morocco has consistently maintained that Western Sahara has been 
part of the interior of Morocco by common ethnological, cultural, and religious ties, and that 
Sakiet El Hamra was artificially separated from it by Spanish colonization. The claim of 
sovereignty by Morocco over the Saharan territory is grounded on a number of factors and 
these are: permanent and peaceful presence of Morocco in the Sahara, public display of 
sovereignty that was uninterrupted and uncontested for centuries and which was evidenced by 
the general acquiescence of the international community, religious ties binding Western 
Sahara to Morocco (which the latter claims implies political allegiance), the appointment and 
its renewal thereof of Sheikhs upon the accession of each Sultan, the imposition of Koranic 
taxes and levies, and the dispatch of armed forces to repel invaders trying to penetrate the 
Saharan coasts. Morocco also relied on two visits by Sultan Hassan 1 to the southern area of 
the Souss in 1882 and 1886 which were aimed at maintaining and strengthening his authority 
in the southern part of his jurisdiction. Spain countered Morocco’s position by stating that 
there is no documentary evidence to support the thesis that Morocco had political authority 
over Western Sahara.
129
 But this argument appears to be logically flawed on the strength of 
the fact that documentary transactions were almost a thing of obscurity in the traditional 
Muslim world and the forms of political authority exercised by Third World “sovereigns” 
differed in almost all respects from that of classical international law. 
4.5 The Nature and Legal Weight of Advisory Opinions of the ICJ 
 
Generally, only States in international law have the locus standi to approach the ICJ for a 
determination of any legal question of a contentious nature. Nevertheless, the UN devised a 
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procedure by which public international organizations can have standing before the Court.
130
 
The advisory jurisdiction, opinion and procedure of the ICJ are peculiar and could be said to 
be in a class of its own. The ICJ issues advisory opinions on legal questions and this must be 
at the request of any of the organs of the UN or specialized agencies authorized to make such 
a request. The advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ is triggered by the filing of a written request 
for an advisory opinion addressed to the Registrar of the ICJ by the Secretary-General of the 
UN or the Director or Secretary-General of the organization requesting the opinion. Beyond 
the facts that the advisory opinions of the Court have significant legal and moral weight, 
contributes to the elucidation and development of international law, strengthens diplomacy 
and peace in international relations, the advisory opinions of the Court are not binding 
(except in rare instances). Consequently, it is the requesting organization that decides whether 
or not to give effect to such opinion and how to proceed in that regard. 
4.6 The People of Western Sahara and their Right to Self-Determination 
In the Advisory Opinion, the ICJ, in stressing the significance of ensuring that the outcome of 
the dispute over the control of Western Sahara reflects the true wish of the concerned people 
outlined the two essential features of self-determination in the context of decolonization as 
follows: 
(i) Free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory; and 
(ii) Informed and democratic processes impartially conducted based on universal 
adult suffrage 
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 In this way, the Court established the free and genuine expression of peoples of the 
territory as the dominant narrative of self-determination and legal ties as a source of counter-
narratives.
131
 These features presupposes that the decision whether the territory of Western 
Sahara is to be fully independent or integrated with the Kingdom of Morocco should be 
devoid of any form of coercion or manipulation as currently being experienced. Simply put, 
due regard must be had to the freely expressed wish of the concerned people. It is believed 
that the exercise of freedom of expression will engender lasting peace in the territory. 
4.6.1 Background to the Dispute 
The Western Sahara dispute is peculiar in that it did not arise independently in bilateral 
relations between States but it is a legal controversy that arose from the proceedings of the 
UN General Assembly on the decolonization of Non-Self Governing Territories. In an effort 
to liberate the people of Western Sahara from the grip of colonialism and give effect to their 
right to self-determination, the UN, relying on Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of 
the Statute of the ICJ, sought the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legal status of the 
territory of Western Sahara. The two specific questions referred to the Court for its opinion 
by the General Assembly Resolution 3292 (XXIX) were:  
1. “Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?; and if this 
question is answered in the negative,   
2. What were the legal ties (if any) between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?”132 
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4.6.2 Colonization of the Third World and the Concept of Terra Nullius 
The concept of terra nullius which has its origin in Roman property law is associated with 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ European colonization of the Third World. 
“International law is universal... And yet, the universality of international law is a relatively 
recent development. It was not until the end of nineteenth century that a set of doctrines was 
established as applicable to all States, whether these were in Asia, Africa, or Europe.
133
 In 
international law, it was a legitimate way of acquiring original title to territory in the Third 
World if such acquisition was done through effective occupation. For there to be an effective 
occupation, the concerned territory must be terra nullius – a territory/land belonging to no 
one. “If the natives belonged to what positivists regarded as an uncivilized and yet organized 
polity, however, European powers would have to assert title through some other means such 
as conquest or cession”.134 Terra nullius was a concept that governed European territorial 
claims and technically adopted by the Europeans to justify their conquest and dispossession 
of indigenous lands in Africa and thus advance their political and economic interests. This is 
partly why TWAIL sees international law as an illegitimate and predatory legal system that 
guarantees sovereign equality and self-determination and yet advances the legacies of 
imperialism and colonial conquest.
135
 Terra nullius is traceable to the prejudice and 
hierarchical posture of international law against the Third World. It was basically aimed at 
denying international legal personality to Third World peoples and thus makes them easily 
prone to the predatory and exploitative tendencies of colonization. From the TWAILian 
perspective, international is being used by Europeans as a political and economic manoeuvre 
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to perpetrate, assert, and justify their colonial tendencies. The concept of terra nullius brings 
to mind the asymmetrical relationship that existed (or still exists) between the Europeans and 
Third World peoples. Terra nullius as constructed by Europeans has no bearing with African 
realities and peculiarities. As has been demonstrated in chapter two, even before the invasion 
of Africa by the colonial powers, the territory was occupied, patterned, and governed along 
monarchical forms. But except for the colonial theory and construction of the concept of terra 
nullius, the first question for determination before the ICJ is logically invalid in view of the 
sophisticated social and political structure of African Kingdoms. The idea of terra nullius is a 
“mechanism of exclusion”.136 In the predatory character of international law, “a territory is 
ownerless in international law as long as it belongs to no subject of international law...In so 
far as it was not under European dominion; Africa was considered a terra nullius. Subjects of 
international law are only those States who exercise all rights of sovereignty and perform 
State functions in the same way as modern European States”.137  
The Court in its wisdom addressed the two questions separately. The Court considered “the 
time of colonization by Spain” as the period dating back to 1884 when Spain proclaimed 
protectorate over the territory known as Rio de Oro. The ICJ in dealing a death blow on the 
fallacious concept of terra nullius in the Advisory Opinion stated that Spain having found 
local Chiefs in Western Sahara in 1884 that were competently governing their local 
populations, and in recognition of such governance had negotiated and entered into 
agreements with those Chiefs, it could not effectively anchor its sovereignty over Western 
Sahara on a claim that the land was owned by no one.  The Court noted that the mode of 
acquisition of Western Sahara by Spain which was by “cession” and not occupation affirms 
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the argument that Spain derived its root of title over the territory from the agreements with 
the local Chiefs. Again, in colonizing Western Sahara, Spain did not hold itself out as 
establishing sovereignty over terra nullius but relied on the agreements of protection entered 
into with the tribal chiefs. Therefore, based on State practice of the relevant period as well as 
the evidence before it, the ICJ found that Western Sahara was not a terra nullius at the time of 
colonization by Spain. 
 At the time of colonization by Spain, Western Sahara was inhabited by nomadic 
people who were nevertheless socially and politically organized along tribal lines under the 
administration of competent Chiefs. The Court reasoned that territories inhabited by tribes or 
peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius. 
Therefore, the lawful acquisition of territories of such nature was only through agreements 
concluded with local rulers and not through unilateral occupation.
138
  
 In answering the second question, the Court gave regard to the nomadic way of life of 
the people of Western Sahara, the peculiarity of the territory vis-à-vis their pasture, crops, 
intermittent rainfall as well as the political and social organization of the population. 
 Morocco contended that its legal ties with Western Sahara at the time of colonization 
by Spain were one of historical and immemorial possession. It relied on the period of the 
Arab conquest of North Africa in the 7
th
 century A.D., and the geographical contiguity of 
Western Sahara to Morocco and argued that for a long period, Morocco was the only 
independent State which existed in the north-west of Africa. In an effort to convince the 
Court about its display of sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco drew the attention of 
the Court to its alleged acts of internal display of authority and some international acts that 
could constitute recognition by other States of its sovereignty over the whole or part of 
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Western Sahara. But in the Court’s view, the decisive factor in resolving the second question 
is the direct evidence in respect of effective display of authority over Western Sahara at the 
time of its colonization by Spain and in the period immediately preceding that time and not 
indirect inferences drawn from past historical events. 
 In Spain’s view, there is no documentary evidence or other traces of a display of 
political authority by Morocco with respect to Western Sahara. Spain questioned the unity of 
the Saharan region with the regions of southern Morocco.  
 The Court reasoned that beyond the indications that a legal tie of allegiance existed at 
the relevant period between the Sultan and some nomadic peoples of Western Sahara, going 
by the evidence before it, there is no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara 
and the Kingdom of Morocco nor is there any indication of effective and exclusive State 
activity in Western Sahara. 
 On the legal ties which existed between Western Sahara, at the time of its 
colonization by Spain, and the Mauritanian entity, the Court and Mauritania were in 
alignment in respect of the peculiarity of Mauritania in relation to Western Sahara on the 
ground that Mauritania did not then constitute a State and hence the Statehood of Mauritania 
is not retroactive.
139
 Therefore, the Court was not concerned with the legal ties of State 
sovereignty of Mauritanian entity but other legal ties which by their nature, knew no frontiers 
between the territories and were vital to the maintenance of life in the region. Mauritania 
noted that the term “Mauritanian entity” was used by the General Assembly to denote the 
cultural, geographical, and social entity which existed at the time in the region of Western 
Sahara and within which the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was later to be created. 
 Mauritania pointed out to the Court the special character of the Saharan region 
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namely - the tribal territories, migration routes, and the nomadic lifestyle of the people 
therein – factors which the colonial Powers gave no regard to in carving out the artificial 
boundaries of the territory.  
 As to the legal ties between Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity, Mauritania 
argued that at the time of colonization by Spain, the Mauritanian entity extended from the 
Senegal River to the Wad Sakiet El Hamra.
140
 It further submitted that the part of the 
territories now under Spanish administration was an integral part of the Mauritanian entity. In 
concluding that the legal relation between the part under Spanish administration and the 
Mauritanian entity was one of inclusion, Mauritania urged the Court to find that “at the time 
of colonization by Spain, the part of the Sahara now under Spanish administration did have 
legal ties with the Mauritanian entity”.141 
 Spain submitted that at its time of colonization of the territory, there were no legal ties 
between the territory of Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity. Spain based its argument 
here on the fact that the concept of Mauritanian entity is not accompanied by proof of any tie 
of allegiance between the tribes inhabiting the territory of Western Sahara and the 
Mauritanian tribes. According to Spain, beyond the mere sociological facts about nomadic 
life, the tribes of Western Sahara led their own life independently of the other Saharan tribes. 
 The Court held that whereas the nomadic way of life of the people of Western Sahara 
at the time of its colonization gave rise to certain ties of a legal character between the tribes 
of the territory and those of neighboring regions, there did not exist at the time of 
                                                          
140
 Located in the northern part of Western Sahara, it is one of the two territories that formed the Spanish 
province of Spanish Sahara after 1969. 
141
 Western Sahara Case, supra note 13 at para. 140. 
 71 
 
colonization by Spain, any tie of sovereignty or allegiance of tribes between the territory of 
Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity. 
 The Court therefore came to the conclusion that on the strength of the evidence before 
it, there were legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes 
living in the territory of Western Sahara but there was no legal tie of territorial sovereignty 
between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian 
entity. The Court found that there is no legal tie of such a nature that could affect the 
decolonization of Western Sahara or the principle of self-determination through the free and 
genuine will of the peoples of the territory. “The claims of Morocco and Mauritania were 
based on the proposition that ethnic, historical, and other ties pre-dating colonization could 
operate to override the wishes of the people within the colonially established territorial 
framework...”142 
 Firstly, the ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Western Sahara to the effect that “there 
was no legal tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the 
Kingdom of Morocco ...” should be seen in the light of the resolve of the UN to liberate the 
people from colonialism. As the Court noted, “the right of that population [Western Sahara] 
to self-determination constitutes therefore a basic assumption of the questions put to the 
Court”.143 By pointing out this fact, the Court which is an organ of the UN was rightly 
placing emphasis and significance to the need to liberate the human population in Western 
Sahara from the grip of colonialism. The Court was more or less making a policy Opinion to 
accentuate the resolution of the UN to decolonize territories. This is because the ICJ 
acknowledged that whereas there were indeed ties of allegiance between Morocco and the 
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indigenous population of Western Sahara, but they were not strong and enough justification 
not to give effect to the UN resolution to decolonize Western Sahara. The Court also noted 
that whatever questions it had been invited to determine, the applicable principles of 
decolonization call for examination since they are an essential part of the framework of the 
questions contained in the request. 
 What forms of authorities were exercised by the various rulers, Empires, and Kings in 
pre-colonial Africa? As has been demonstrated in chapter two, pre-colonial Africa had 
sophisticated structure of governance and conducted many international affairs in the areas of 
commerce and diplomacy. However, all across Africa, the exercise of authority by various 
Empires and Kingdoms were more of a fusion of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 
The overlaps of these functions were crystal clear in the manner that the Empires and Kings 
discharged their authorities. There was rarely a clear-cut distinction. Even where there 
appeared to be one, the final determination and sanction of the decision resided with the 
King. Historical facts concerning the mode and level of authority exercised by the Sultan of 
Morocco which was an admixture of executive, legislative and religious powers lends 
credence to the fact that the King of Morocco was regarded as a State institution. The Sultan 
exercised those powers by means of a decree known as Dahir. The ICJ manifested cynicism, 
prejudice, and disregard concerning this form of political structure owing to the fact that it 
was strange to the European model of Statehood. 
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4.7 Modern and Internal Colonialism in the Third World 
The African States that are interested parties before the ICJ in the dispute over Western 
Sahara have two things in common – they are former European colonies144 and Islamic 
States. It is deeply saddening that at the twilight of Spanish colonization of Western Sahara, 
these former colonies that should be at the forefront of decolonization campaign in the Third 
World territories turned around to become colonial Powers against one of its own apparently 
for the purpose of boosting economic, political, and national prestige. The current Moroccan 
occupation of the Sahara is an unfashionable and condemnable expansion of territory and a 
bad omen for the peoples of Third World. The forced integration of Western Sahara into the 
Kingdom of Morocco does violence to the spirit of right to self-determination. Whereas this 
modern and internal colonialism by Morocco practically curtails the right to self-
determination of the people of Western Sahara, it is also tantamount to making resolution 
1514 (XV) which the former rode on to gain independence of no effect. It is even 
unpleasantly astonishing and ridiculous that Morocco still sits in the UN with other States to 
deliberate on global peace. Morocco should incur the wrath of the UN by being expelled from 
the world body as its acts concerning the Western Sahara shows that it has no regard for true 
democratic principles; lest this will continue to set a bad precedence in the international 
domain. The act of Morocco in holding tenaciously to the territory of Western Sahara not 
only frustrates the capability and possibility of the people to develop to their fullest potential 
which is very needful in the Third World but it also perpetrates avoidable ethnic conflicts and 
rivalries that takes its toll on all spheres of lives of the civilian population in the territory. The 
international legal norm of self-determination is an anti-colonial and liberating principle but 
paradoxically, Morocco has so far been ‘permitted’ to carry on in the Western Sahara 
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territory in a manner that renders the principle almost meaningless. The Court’s Opinion that 
upheld the application of decolonization of the people of Western Sahara is clear enough: 
 “...the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not 
 establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara 
and  the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found 
legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in 
the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine will of the territory”.145 
 Morocco’s act of marching into and taking over the Western Sahara territory shortly 
after the signing of the Madrid Accord on the claim that the territory was merely detached 
from it during colonization by Spain is not only a violation of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda but portrays the Kingdom as a State that has no regard for diplomacy, freedom of 
expression, and popular will of a people. This posture of Morocco has practically grounded 
the quest for the realization of the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara 
and negates the right of the concerned people to freedom from outside interference. 
 Morocco is a signatory to the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)146 as well as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).147 Morocco is working against the purposes of the UN as 
expressed in Article 1(2) of the Charter by frustrating the possibility of realizing self-
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determination by the Saharan population and promoting armed conflict in the territory. 
Article 1(2) provides that: 
“The purposes of the United Nations are: to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” 
 Again, Morocco covenanted in Article 1 of ICESCR that: 
 “...Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United  
 Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
 freedoms; 
 All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
 freely  determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social  and 
 cultural development”. 
  Article 1(3) of the ICCPR provides that: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self Governing Territories, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
 The state of affairs currently existing in Western Sahara shows the degree of contempt 
and levity with which Morocco treats the letters and spirit of these covenants to which it is a 
party. It depicts the Kingdom of Morocco in the world map as a Third World State that is 
contributing significantly in destabilizing the continent of Africa. 
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 Although the Court acknowledged that resolution 1541 (XV) contemplates up to three 
possibilities for Non-Self-Governing Territories namely: emergence as a sovereign 
independent State, free association with an independent State, and integration with an 
independent State;
148
 it is submitted that the idea is to have the concerned population freely 
and genuinely choose from the available options and not to compel it to accept a particular 
option.  
4.8 The Role of Spain in the Conflict 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) concerning Declaration on the granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples in paragraph 5 provides thus: 
Paragraph 5 – “Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self Governing 
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those 
territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance 
with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction 
as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom”. 
 The instability that has engulfed the north-west Africa could be traced to the 
‘decolonization’ procedure that Spain chose to follow when it was ‘forced out’ of Western 
Sahara. Why would Spain hand over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania? The 
‘people’ that Resolution 1514 (XV) refers to here are undoubtedly the people of Western 
Sahara who were under Spanish colonization and not Morocco.  It is submitted that Spain’s 
handing over of the administrative control of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania 
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smacks of bad faith. It was a mischievous move that had the least interest of the population at 
heart and it is fraught with illegality. The illegality lies in the fact that Western Sahara is 
currently listed by the UN as a Non-Self Governing Territory but ridiculously enough; 
Morocco is never listed or recognized as the administering Power. It was this fundamental 
wrong course of action taken by Spain that got us all into this socio-political and legal 
quagmire. Since Spain’s position before the ICJ was that there is no tie between Western 
Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania, why did Spain hand over the territory to Morocco? 
Does this not amount to blowing hot and cold? Was Spain’s act here not a calculated attempt 
to perpetually keep a people under colonialism and bondage and ultimately perpetrate 
conflict? It more or less appears that Spain’s abrupt exit as one of the colonial Powers in 
north-west Africa embittered it. The Madrid Accord entered into between Spain, Morocco, 
and Mauritania was Spain’s unique and calculated attempt to perpetuate confusion, armed 
conflict, and under-development on the Third World peoples of Western Sahara. It represents 
one colonial legacy of confusion left by Europeans to perpetually haunt the people of North 
Africa. It is saddening that all the stakeholders in this debacle have allowed this plot to 
succeed for about four decades. Again, that the UN did not oppose timeously Spain’s handing 
over of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania in view of the duo’s vested interest in the 
territory speaks volume of international law’s conspiracy and unfairness against Third World 
peoples. The procedure that Spain took in handing over the territory to Morocco undermines 
the efforts of the UN and portrays the latter as practically ineffective.       
 The case and status of Western Sahara is one of inchoate and pseudo-decolonization. 
By handing over the administrative machinery to Morocco, Spain appeared to have exercised 
the right of self-determination on behalf of the people of Western Sahara and certainly set the 
people of north-west Africa on a warpath with one another. Owing to the political instability 
in the territory, the people of Western Sahara cannot enjoy the natural resources in their soil 
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indicating that the colonial project generally served to accelerate development in Europe and 
retard same in the Third World. 
 Morocco appreciates the degree of illegality of its forced annexation of Western 
Sahara and so has never transmitted information concerning the territory to the UN Secretary-
General as provided for in Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. Thus, Morocco is continually in 
violation of 73(b) of the UN Charter which provides that: 
 Article 73  “Members of the United Nations which have or assume   
   responsibilities for the administration of territories whose   
   peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government  
   recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of  
   these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the  
   obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of   
   international  peace and security established by the present  
   Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories,  
   and, to this end: 
 73(b) “to develop self-government, to take due account of the political  
 aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
 development of their free political institutions, according to the particular 
 circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
 advancement”. 
 This chapter has attempted to trace the historical factors that led to the conflict 
in Western Sahara and the mischievous role played by Spain in the whole saga. In the 
next chapter, the study will look at the struggles that led to the realization of the right 
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to self-determination in the island of East Timor after suffering many years of 
brutality and losses in the hands of neighbouring Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 EAST TIMOR: SELF-DETERMINATION, ANNEXATION BY INDONESIA AND 
THE “CIVILIZING MISSION” OF PORTUGAL 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The realization of a full-fledged right to self-determination by the people of East Timor in 
2002 was in phases. The first phase was in 1975 from their primary colonial Power – 
Portugal, but that freedom was a fleeting one as the liberation was truncated through a 
military invasion by neighboring Indonesia.    
 The European colonization of the Island of Timor dates back to the 16
th
 century when 
the Portuguese claimed it in 1515. Whereas the Dutch colonialists settled in the western part 
of Timor in 1640, the Portuguese were compelled to move to East Timor. In a bid to 
demarcate their boundaries and make certain their “possessions” in the Island of Timor, 
Portugal and The Netherlands signed two Treaties at Lisbon on 20 April 1859 and 10 June 
1893 and another at The Hague on 1 October 1904 wherein the two colonial powers 
demarcated the boundary between East and West Timor apparently for their own commercial 
and political gains. But the boundary treaty was finalized on 25 June 1914 when the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) drew the definitive boundary which has since then 
remained the international boundary between contemporary East Timor and Indonesia.
149
 
“The direct involvement of European States in the scramble for colonies led to a number of 
complications. Legal niceties were hardly a concern of European States powerfully intent on 
imperial expansion. Given the conceptual inadequacies of the positivist framework for 
dealing with the colonial encounter ...and the intense competition among European States for 
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colonies, it was hardly surprising that international law contributed very little towards the 
effective management of colonial scramble. The tensions arising from the scramble were 
such that the European powers held the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 to try and resolve 
matters”.150 
5.1 Background of East Timor 
East Timor officially known as Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is a State in South-
eastern Asia with a population of about 1,114,000 peoples.
151
 It is one of the Third World 
States whose history is largely shaped by European and Asian colonialism. East Timor was 
originally and primarily colonized by Portugal and secondarily
152
 colonized by Indonesia. “It 
is hardly controversial that one of the primary driving forces of nineteenth-century colonial 
expansion was trade. The right to enter other territories to trade, the freedom of commerce 
asserted so powerfully and inevitably even in Vitoria’s time, was a principal rule of 
nineteenth-century legal and diplomatic relations”.153 Thus, attracted by the abundance of 
sandalwood, honey, wax, and slaves in East Timor; Portuguese trade explorers established 
trade links with the Island of Timor. East Timor was declared a Portuguese colony in 1769 
after the European traders had established a trading outpost in Dili.
154
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5.2Momentary and Permanent Self-Determination in East Timor 
On 28 November 1975, East Timor gained independence from Portugal but the joys, 
excitement, and celebration of that freedom was short-lived as it was invaded and occupied 
by neighboring Indonesia only nine days thereafter. However, the annexation by Indonesia 
was not recognized by the UN as the latter formally appointed Portugal as the administering 
Power of East Timor. Civil conflict widely believed to have been perpetrated and funded by 
the Indonesian government in order to consolidate its forced annexation of and sovereignty 
over the people of East Timor ensued and thousands lost their lives. “The doctrine of self-
determination, that had been developed in the inter-war period principally in relation to the 
peoples of eastern Europe, was now adopted and adapted by the UN to further and manage 
the transformation of colonial territories into independent, sovereign States. The modern 
doctrine of self-determination, then, was formulated in response to the whole phenomenon of 
colonialism”.155 Consequently, on 30 August 1999, the people of East Timor via a UN-
supervised referendum unmistakably spoke in one accord in favor of their right to determine 
their political and social future. Thus, the right to self-determination was realized by East 
Timor when on 20 May 2002, it was formally recognized as an independent State and was 
admitted into the UN on 27 September 2002. 
5.3 The Genesis of the Dispute at the ICJ 
On 11 December 1989, Indonesia and Australia entered into a treaty (“The Timor Gap 
Treaty”) to enable the exploration and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the 
continental shelf of the area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and northern 
Australia. This area is believed to be extremely rich in oil and natural gas reserves and so 
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should ordinarily be the main economic base of the people of East Timor upon their 
realization of self-determination. A joint Australian/Indonesian regime was set up for 
exploiting the oil resources on the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor. The 
treaty would remain in force for an initial period of 40 years from the date of its entry into 
force and shall continue in force after the initial 40-year term for successive terms of 20 
years, unless by the end of each term, including the initial term of 40 years, the two States 
have concluded an agreement on the permanent continental shelf delimitation in the area 
covered by the Zone of Cooperation.  
 The nucleus of the dispute between Portugal and Australia before the ICJ was not in 
respect of the decolonization of East Timor but in respect of the Timor Gap Treaty between 
Australia and Indonesia and the cognate rights that could flow therefrom vis-à-vis the people 
of East Timor. By virtue of Article 34 paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ, “only States may 
be parties in cases before the Court”. Thus, Portugal as the administering Power over the 
territory of East Timor instituted a proceeding against Australia before the ICJ on 22 
February 1991 concerning certain activities of Australia with respect to East Timor. Portugal 
claimed that Australia had by its conduct failed to observe the obligation to respect the duties 
and powers of Portugal as the administering power of East Timor and the right of the people 
of East Timor to self-determination and the related rights. Consequently, Australia, according 
to Portugal, had incurred international responsibility in relation to the people of East Timor 
and Portugal. 
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5.4 Indonesia’s Annexation of East Timor and the Politics of Re-
colonization in the Third World 
Indonesia through its military forcefully annexed East Timor on 7 December 1975 thereby 
abruptly ending the fledgling, popular, and Portugal-backed government of East Timor led by 
the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (“FRETILIN”).  This military assault 
by Indonesia, itself a beneficiary of the principle of right to self-determination, against the 
newly-liberated people of East Timor did not go unchallenged by the latter but Indonesia 
prevailed through the procurement of advanced weaponry from the United States and 
Australia. The United Nations deplored the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia and called 
on Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity and withdraw without 
delay its military forces from the territory of East Timor in order to enable the people to 
freely exercise their right to self-determination and independence.
156
 Indonesia advanced 
anti-colonial unity and realization of the peoples’ right to self-determination as its reasons for 
annexation of East Timor. It stated that the colonial division of the island of Timor into east 
and west was a result of colonial assault and oppression perpetrated by the Portuguese and 
Dutch imperial powers. Therefore, its annexation of East Timor was aimed at the restoration 
of the original unity that had existed in the entire Island before the arrival of the colonial 
Powers. This reasoning of Indonesia is partly fraught with contradictions in view of the fact 
that the idea behind the principle of self-determination is the liberation of a people from 
socio-political oppression and bondage. In the case of the people of East Timor, it was about 
freedom from foreign domination, whether by Portugal or Indonesia. “The right of self-
determination has primarily to do with a collective right of a people to govern themselves, 
creating a voluntary civil society, usually by creating a State. It is about the right of a people 
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to constitute a State”.157 Self-determination was proclaimed as an anti-colonialist principle; 
its obvious aim was to disrupt colonial empires and redistribute power in the international 
community on the basis of the idea of equality among nations, thereby assisting in the 
emergence of new international subjects consisting of those peoples which had previously 
been subjected to colonialist rule.
158
 It is hardly about being forcibly annexed by or integrated 
with an existing or neighboring State against the wishes and desires of a people. Much as 
Principle VI of the UN Resolution 1541 (XV)
159
 envisages three different options for the 
attainment of full measure of self-government by a non-self-governing territory namely: 
emergence as a sovereign independent State; free association with an independent State; or 
integration with an independent State; notwithstanding, Principle VII provides that “free 
association [with an independent State] should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by 
the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic 
process”.160 
 “Article 1(1) of the International covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
prohibits States from meddling in the affairs of another contracting State, in a manner that 
seriously infringes upon the right of that State ‘freely to determine [its] political status and 
economic, social and cultural development’. It prohibits contracting States from invading and 
occupying the territory of other contracting States in such a manner as to deprive the people 
                                                          
157
 See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995) at 92. 
158
 See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) at 317. 
159
 See General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) passed on 15 December 1960 - Principles which should guide 
Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Art. 
73(e) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
160
 See Principle VII para. (a) of GA Res 1541 (XV) UNGAOR, 15th Sess, Supp No 38, UN Doc A/4651 (1960) 
29. 
 86 
 
living there of their right to self-determination. Military occupation and, a fortiori, 
annexation of a foreign territory amounts to a grave breach of Article 1(1).”161 The right as 
contained in Article 1(1) is available to the people even when they are yet to realize 
independence.  
 Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor lasted for over two decades largely because it 
enjoyed the support of the United States, Australia, United Kingdom; and Australia was the 
only western State to recognize Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor apparently for 
economic and political interests. “Self-determination is significant jurisprudentially. For one 
thing, its study enables us to inquire into the underlying tensions and contradictions of 
international relations as well as the interplay of law and politics on the world scene. For 
another, self-determination belongs to an area where States’ interests and views are so 
conflicting that States are unable to agree upon definite and specific standards of 
behavior...”162  
 Indonesia’s re-colonization of East Timor and the attendant decimation of the civilian 
population therein speak volumes of how low the ethics in governance of some Third World 
leaders have fallen especially when they are nudged by some Western leaders. It shows how 
power-drunk and brutal the leaders in Third World States could be in order to plunder the 
resources in a contiguous territory. “If East Timor can be considered a microcosm of Third 
World expropriation by developed countries, then the territory’s occupation by Indonesia in 
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1975 was also an example of how corrupt administrations in developing countries can assume 
the aggressive colonial practices normally associated with Western imperialism”.163 
5.5 Australia’s Arguments 
In its Counter-Memorial, Australia relied on the case of Monetary Gold Removed from Rome 
in 1943
164
 to argue that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear Portugal’s claim. Australia argued 
that in view of the principle established in the Monetary case which is to the effect that the 
Court could not adjudicate on the claims of parties (Italy and UK) to a certain quantity of 
Albanian gold in the absence of a third State (Albania) which was not before it; and the fact 
that Indonesia is not before the Court, the ICJ cannot assume jurisdiction in the present case. 
It was Australia’s contention that for there to be an effective determination of the case against 
it, it was a condition precedent that the Court must determine the legality or illegality of the 
occupation of East Timor by Indonesia. Australia maintained that there is in reality no dispute 
between itself and Portugal and that the true respondent is Indonesia and that it is erroneously 
being sued in place of Indonesia.
165
 
 In response to the jurisdictional question, the Court held that for the purpose of 
verifying the existence of a legal dispute in the present case, it is not relevant whether the real 
dispute is between Portugal and Indonesia rather than Portugal and Australia. The Court 
concluded that Portugal had, rightly or wrongly, formulated complaints of fact and law 
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against Australia which the latter has denied. Thus, by virtue of this denial, there is a 
legal/justiciable dispute between Portugal and Australia.
166
 
 The Court considered Australia’s principal argument to the effect that Portugal’s 
application would require the Court to determine the rights and obligations of Indonesia. 
Australia argued that by virtue of the declarations made by the parties under Article 36 
paragraph 2 of the Statute of ICJ which conferred jurisdiction on the Court over the case, the 
Court would not be able to act if in order to do so, it would rule on the lawfulness of 
annexation of East Timor by Indonesia and on the validity of the 1989 Treaty and on the 
rights and obligations of Indonesia under that Treaty. Portugal agreed that if its application 
required the Court to decide any of these questions, the Court could not entertain it.
167
 
5.6 Portugal’s Claims 
Portugal contended that its application is concerned exclusively with the objective conduct of 
Australia which consisted in having negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the 
1989 Treaty with Indonesia, and that this question is perfectly separable from any question 
relating to the lawfulness of the conduct of Indonesia. According to Portugal, the conduct of 
Australia with regards to the 1989 Treaty constitutes a breach of its obligation to treat East 
Timor as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and Portugal as its Administering Power; and that 
breach could be passed upon by the Court by itself and without passing upon the rights of 
Indonesia.
168
 Portugal contended that its claim before the Court is against Australia and not 
against Indonesia and that even if Indonesia may be affected by the judgment, the conduct 
that forms the subject matter of the case is that of Australia. 
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 In response to Portugal’s contention, the Court noted that one of the fundamental 
principles of its Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent 
of those States to its jurisdiction. Thus, the Court concluded that Australia’s behavior could 
not be assessed without first entering into the question why it is that Indonesia could not 
lawfully have concluded the 1989 Treaty, while Portugal allegedly could have done so hence, 
that the Court could not make such a determination in the absence of the consent of 
Indonesia.
169
 
 Portugal further argued that the rights which Australia breached were rights erga 
omnes and that accordingly, Portugal could require it, individually, to respect them regardless 
of whether or not another State had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner. The 
Court noted that the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are 
two different things. Therefore, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of 
another State which is not a party to the case. Nevertheless, the Court stated that Portugal’s 
assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination as it evolved from the Charter and 
from the UN practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable; and that the right to 
self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the UN Charter and in the 
jurisprudence of the Court; it is one of the essential principles of international law.
170
 
 The Court concluded that given the nature and facts of this case, Indonesia’s rights 
and obligations would definitely constitute the very subject matter of the judgment made in 
the absence of Indonesia’s consent. Such a judgment would run directly counter to the well-
established principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the 
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Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.
171
 The Court noted that for 
Portugal and Australia, the territory of East Timor remains a Non-Self-Governing Territory 
and its people have a right to self-determination.
172
 Relying on the case of the Monetary Gold 
and jurisdictional ground, the Court declined to entertain the case. 
 The ICJ is ordinarily supposed to be a Court of law and equity that should contribute 
in advancing the ideals of the United Nations and as Judge Weeramantry stated correctly in 
his dissenting opinion: “East Timor is a non-self-governing territory recognized as such by 
the General Assembly and the Security Council, and acknowledged by the Respondent 
[Australia] to be still of that status...the applicant [Portugal] is under a duty under 
international law to take necessary steps to conserve the rights of the people of East 
Timor”.173 By declining jurisdiction on the East Timor case and having restated that “the 
principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter 
and in the jurisprudence of the Court...”174 the ICJ appeared to have contributed to the 
ambiguity and vagueness that have over time characterized the principle of self-
determination. The pronouncement was a tacit judicial backing of the plunder of the peoples’ 
natural resources and continual dehumanization of the East Timorese. The judgment is 
surprisingly saddening and unhelpful to the aspirations of the people of East Timor especially 
when it is believed in some quarters that “self-determination has set in motion a restructuring 
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and redefinition of the world community’s basic ‘rules of the game’”.175 As an anti-colonial 
principle, for self-determination to be effectively given its practical meaning for the benefit of 
a people under foreign domination and subjugation as the East Timorese, it should “promote 
democratic self-government and free access of peoples to the role of international actors”. 
The ICJ pronouncement on the East Timor case is not in sync with one of the purposes of the 
United Nations as contained in Article 1 paragraph 2 which is “to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. 
 The report card of Portugal’s colonization of East Timor was particularly notorious 
for its neglect of the development of the territory; brutality and exploitation of the colonial 
subjects. From time immemorial, Portugal was not favorably disposed to (or at best has been 
indifferent to) the concept of decolonization as introduced by the United Nations. It colonized 
East Timor for about four centuries and was one of the two States that voted against one of 
the two important resolutions adopted by the UN for Non-Self-Governing Territories to have 
the opportunity to freely choose the manner in which their right to self-determination would 
be realized.
176
 Portugal’s case against Australia at the ICJ might not have been borne out of a 
genuine desire to protect the interest of the people of East Timor. Perhaps, Portugal moved 
against Australia at the ICJ because it felt that as the former colonial Power and the then 
Administering Power of East Timor, it had the ‘exclusive right’ to sit over and enjoy the 
natural resources of the administered territory. Therefore it considered it an assault on the 
sensibilities of Portugal for ‘third parties’ to control and disburse the wealth located in its 
administered territory. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has analyzed the ICJ decisions in the Cameroon and Nigeria; Western Sahara; and 
East Timor conflicts from the lens of Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL). The colonial encounter between Europe and the Third World and its negative 
impacts in various former colonies is an unpleasant product of the ‘civilizing mission’ of the 
Imperialists in these territories. In this work, historical factors have been used to establish a 
nexus between colonialism and the army of conflicts that have continued to assail the Third 
World which calls for decisive action from the concerned peoples. As a result of the colonial 
enterprise, the post-colonial Third World has been a victim of series of civil unrests and 
instability. Millions of people have lost their lives while many others that are fortunate to be 
alive are forced to live under the most inhuman conditions. 
 Attempt has been made to depict the disruptive effects of European colonization in 
Africa spurred by economic and political interests. The present condition of Bakassi peoples 
shows the attendant chaos that would inevitably befall Third World peoples when “in 1884-
85, the European imperial powers met in Berlin and without the consent or the participation 
of African people, demarcated the continent of Africa into colonies or spheres of influence. In 
many cases, kingdoms or tribes were split with such reckless abandon that they came under 
two or three European imperial powers”.177 The fate of Bakassi people demonstrates the 
failure and inadequacy of the discipline of international law to contend with the fallouts of 
European States that gave birth to the scramble for territory in the Third World.  
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 It has also been demonstrated that Africa had cognizable political structure and 
authority as well as diplomatic ties with foreign States as opposed to the notion in some 
quarters to the contrary. The thesis has buttressed these by demonstrating how these 
indigenous Kingdoms were patterned along monarchical forms with their strong systems of 
taxation and shrewdness in various commercial activities thereby generating revenues for the 
Kingdoms. There were clearly established administrative justice systems founded on 
customary and Islamic laws with notable jurists and scholars. Some of the Empires had 
established electoral processes through which an aspirant to an office could emerge. Arab 
colonialism, its consequent trading in slaves and introduction of Islam as a religion in North 
Africa were bad omen for the continent. 
 The application of the right to self-determination has been enmeshed in the miasma 
and caldron of controversies over the doctrine of uti possidetis – itself a colonial heritage. 
Therefore, in the view of the thesis, the nebulous application of self-determination is partly 
traceable to the selfish political interests of the African leaders who brood no opposition in 
their territories as well as the colonial institutions and structures inherited by the existing 
States. 
 On the Bakassi dispute, the thesis has posited that the words of the Treaties and 
agreements relied upon by the Court were not given their literal and ordinary grammatical 
meanings and so were interpreted out of context in violation of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. The ICJ’s interpretation of the various Treaties between the local Kings and 
the colonial Powers were fundamentally erroneous and were presumably a judicial attempt to 
join the league of proponents of the theory that non-European peoples had no sovereign rights 
over their territories. Again, as has been argued in chapter two, the sovereignty and 
governmental structures of non-Europeans date back to the 6
th
 and 7
th
 centuries.  
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 On a critical reflection of the decision in the Cameroon and Nigeria boundary dispute 
and considering the agitation and tensed atmosphere in Bakassi, the ICJ appears to have 
sounded a death knell to the possibility of a peaceful co-existence of the Third World peoples 
in the Peninsula. By not giving regard to the interest of the human population in Bakassi, the 
ICJ decision detracts significantly from the object of the Court and that of the UN at large 
which is to “...bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of peace”.178 
 It is argued that the socio-economic and political interests of the inhabitants of 
Bakassi should have superseded or at least ranked pari pasu with the issue of title. In view of 
the debate and vagueness of the meaning of “a people” in international law, other judicial 
pronouncements and given the features of the people of Bakassi, they meet the requirements 
for the exercise of self-determination. 
 The ICJ judgment in this case and its failure to foster palpable peace in Bakassi is one 
of the strong indications that the Third World is yet to recover fully from the nightmare of 
colonialism after more than half a century. By relying on unconscionable treaties and 
agreements to cede the territory of a large group of people without their consent, the ICJ has 
demonstrated that ‘non-European peoples are the peripheral concerns of international law’.179 
 The conflict in Western Sahara is notorious for lingering for up to four decades. 
However, the people of Western Sahara have consistently been speaking with one voice 
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 See Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the ICJ, 1945. 
179 See generally, Anghie, supra note 4. 
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concerning their right to choose the country that they wish to belong to. They appear, and 
rightly so, relentless in their quest for freedom from domination and exploitation. 
 This thesis has demonstrated how Spain deliberately engineered and triggered the 
current state of socio-political instability in Western Sahara that has ultimately set the people 
of North Africa on a warpath with one another. Spain’s act of handing over of Western 
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania detracts significantly from the UN resolution concerning 
Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and so smacks 
of mischief against the territory. Spain tactically exercised the right to self-determination on 
behalf of the people of Western Sahara. In the view of the thesis, it is Spain that sowed the 
foundational seed of discord that germinated and snowballed into tribal war and displacement 
that have persisted to date. 
 The study has posited that the decolonization process in Western Sahara cannot be 
realized simply by churning out resolutions by the UN to this effect. It submitted that for the 
decolonization project to see the light of the day, it is imperative that it be backed by stronger 
and practical political commitments on the part of the world body. 
 The conflict in Western Sahara appears to be enjoying the blessing of the UN. The 
thesis has argued that the Security Council appears to be hesitant to use relevant provisions of 
the UN Charter to mete out penal measures on the Kingdom of Morocco apparently because 
some of its members are feeding fat from the conflict in North Africa. It has been submitted 
that Morocco should be barred from the world body as a member as its continuous sitting at 
the UN to deliberate on global peace and democratic principles makes caricature of the UN as 
an institution and sets a bad precedence in the world.   
 In the light of the features of the right to self-determination, the process and outcome 
of decolonization of Western Sahara should be devoid of internal and external manipulations 
 96 
 
and coercion. The outcome should be a true reflection of the wishes and desires of the people 
of Western Sahara. 
 The concept of terra nullius which the Europeans had devised to rob the people of 
Third World of international legal personality has no bearing with the realities in the Third 
World. On this score, the thesis submitted that the ICJ did not reckon with the ties between 
the Kingdom of Morocco and people of Western Sahara partly because of the Court’s 
determination to see the latter attain independence and European age-old prejudice against 
the socio-political structure of the Third World which it did not regard as being in sync with 
that of Europe. 
 It has been argued that Indonesia’s claim that its annexation of East Timor was borne 
out of the quest to reclaim and redeem the lost unity that the island of Timor enjoyed prior to 
European colonization is contradictory to the spirit of the principle of self-determination. The 
thesis has submitted that the ICJ’s pronouncement to the effect that “the principle of self-
determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the 
jurisprudence of the Court” and yet declining jurisdiction was akin to approbating and 
reprobating. It did not in any way help the aspirations of the people of East Timor to self-
determination but rather added to the ambiguity and uncertainty of self-determination. 
6.1 Conclusions 
This study has attempted to use the theoretical framework of TWAIL to analyze the 
conditions of instability in some Third World territories foisted upon them by the imperialists 
and accepted, hallowed, and practised by many African leaders. It has employed the 
TWAILian perspective to demonstrate how the regime of international law has continued to 
plunder, dehumanize, subordinate, and annihilate the non-European peoples. These are 
evident in the manner the ICJ ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon without considering 
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the social, political, and legal fate of the inhabitants who are now refugees in their own State. 
With regard to citizenship, it is unclear whether they are Nigerians or Cameroonians. The 
decision of the ICJ in this case has again sustained the TWAILian argument that “neither 
universality nor its promise of global order and stability make international law a just, 
equitable, and legitimate code of governance for the Third World”.180 In view of the fate that 
has befallen the inhabitants of Bakassi Peninsula, ICJ decision in the Cameroon v. Nigeria 
border dispute is devoid of equity and fairness as it has fallen short of achieving justice and 
peace which ought to be the objective of the Court and the UN. 
 But it is high time Third World peoples through their leaders, policy makers, and civil 
society organizations rose up to the challenge facing them in respect of boundary disputes. A 
fundamental and patriotic action is indeed required of it. The National Committee on 
Boundary Adjustments of Cameroon and Nigeria needs to be empowered to move in and 
begin to work together with an objective of definitely marking the boundaries so as to avoid 
future occurrence.  The Third World cannot continue to bemoan the situation thrust upon it 
by the colonialists or pretend that it does not worth its attention when its kiths and kin are 
losing their lives, have lost their main source of livelihood, and are displaced. The situation 
on ground no longer makes it fashionable for African leaders to sit on the fence - for this will 
amount to a great disservice to the millions of affected population across the continent that 
are either directly or indirectly affected. More importantly, there is a need for a change of 
attitude in the pattern of governance by the Third World leaders. Governments exist for the 
welfare of the masses and not that of the few as currently being experienced in many States in 
the territory. There is the need for a synergy and integration between the leaders and the led. 
                                                          
180
 See Antony Anghie “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law” 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999) cited in Makau Mutua “What is TWAIL?” supra note 1 at 
31.  
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When it is very needful, the people should be allowed to exercise their political and economic 
rights to self-determination. These could significantly reduce the spate of conflicts that are 
ravaging the Third World and enhance development in the region. 
 This inquiry has added another value to the TWAILian objectives to the extent that it 
has attempted to use the issues in the three cases to “understand, deconstruct, and unpack the 
uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of racialized 
hierarchy of international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to 
Europeans”.181 On the creation and perpetuation of racialized hierarchy of international 
norms, it has been re-established in chapter two that the sovereignty of Third World States 
which dates back to 6
th
 and 7
th
 centuries could rank pari pasu with that of Europe. Again, 
using TWAIL as an analytical tool, the thesis has shown in chapters two and four how the 
concept of terra nullius is a tool of robbery in the hands of Europeans to deny legal 
personality to the people of Third World in order to take possession of lands therein. 
 TWAIL being a movement that “seeks through scholarship, policy, and politics to 
eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment in the Third World”,182 this study has 
attempted to use its findings to recommend some courses of action to all stakeholders. It is 
hoped that if some of these recommendations are accepted and implemented, some of the 
issues and factors that have threatened development in the territory could be eradicated.    
 Whereas it is advised here that Cameroon and Nigeria comply fully with the ICJ 
decision in the interest of peace, unity, and development of the Third World; and in view of 
the fact that the world Court cannot reverse itself, genuine efforts need to be made by the 
Nigerian and Cameroonian governments to liaise with the UN to organize a 
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plebiscite/referendum for the Bakassi people as has been done in other jurisdictions. This is 
necessary because even if the international community believes that there is peace in the 
Peninsula at the moment, it could well be the peace of a graveyard. Africa has for many 
decades been destabilized by ethnic and political violence and therefore deserves to 
experience peace, unity, and tangible development. Allegations of invasion, harassment, and 
human rights violations of the civilian population in Bakassi by the Cameroonian gendarmes 
or authorities ought to be checked and investigated with a view of meting out appropriate 
punishment to the masterminds. 
 It more or less appears that the UN is reluctant to take a definite position or make a 
definite statement on the application of the right to self-determination so as not to stir up 
more controversy amongst the comity of nations. Therefore, it might not be out of place if the 
ICJ uses its judicial clout in the globe to bring some degree of certainty into the application of 
self-determination whenever the occasion demands. This is likely to contribute to the growth 
of international law. 
 Much as there could be considerable merit in Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over 
Western Sahara from the historic and pre-colonial perspectives, times have changed. 
Colonialism has become archaic and so no longer fashionable. The current status quo in the 
region poses serious threat to the peaceful co-existence and development of Africa. Morocco 
should relinquish sovereignty over Western Sahara now that the ovation is loudest by 
creating a conducive atmosphere for a UN-monitored referendum to be conducted so as to 
determine the genuine wishes of the concerned people. The huge amount of dollars currently 
channeled to the purchase of arms from USA and France, for the prosecution of war in the 
Sahara could be utilized to better the lots of the people of Morocco in various ways. Needless 
to say, that these huge sums put food on the tables of the suppliers and ‘starve’ the 
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purchasers. Africa should consistently rise against this internal colonialism by one of its own 
over another. 
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